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Executive Summary 
 
This report examines the challenges faced by Georgia in its implementation 
of a Prioritized Program Budgeting system, with a particular focus on the 
development of the state’s budgetary program structure.  While there is voluminous 
information about the development and use of performance measures, e.g.,(Hatry 
1999; Poister & Streib 1999; Kittredge & Kissler 1998; Joyce 1999, 2003), there are 
few resources to help guide states through the process of building the initial 
programmatic “platform.”  This initial step, which was first comprehensively 
implemented in the fiscal year (FY) 2006 budget year, has proved more challenging 
for Georgia than was perhaps anticipated.  This report is meant to help the various 
state budget and program officers in Georgia reflect on their current transition from 
line item to program budgets as well as to provide a resource for other states 
considering a similar transition.   
 
History in Brief 
 
 Although Georgia has developed program structures at other times—most 
recently after the adoption of the 1993 Budget and Accountability Act—the 2006 
transition was the most dramatic because for the first time the legislature changed its 
system of budgeting.  The legislative transition was important because legal 
accountability for budgeting shifted from object class to program, and legislative 
attention shifted from a focus on inputs to a focus on agency purposes.  Previously 
agencies had been responsible for ensuring that they did not transfer more than 2 
percent into any one object class appropriation (associated with personal services, 
travel, regular operating expenses, etc.) without legislative approval.  With the switch 
to program budgeting, the legislature imposed transfer controls of 2 percent or 
$250,000 whichever was less on programs in the budget.   
 
Why a Program Based Performance Oriented Budget? 
  
States have been transitioning to performance based budgets in an effort to 
focus resource allocation decisions on outcomes or results rather than on control over 
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inputs.  The theory behind performance based budgeting is that in return for greater 
accountability for results, agency managers will be given increased flexibility to 
manage inputs as necessary in order to produce the desired results.  “Programs” often 
provide the platform for a performance based system because of the intuitive idea that 
that a program is the appropriate budgetary unit for assigning managerial flexibility 
and responsibility for results.  In this formulation, programs are the level at which 
agencies enter into a “contract” to produce results.   
Programs are also often linked to result measures and overall agency goals 
through a strategic planning process.  In this model, programs can be conceptualized 
as the “strategies” that an agency uses to achieve a set of outcomes and ultimately 
overall agency and statewide goals.  The problem is that such definitions and 
guidelines are rarely sufficient—program definitions and the associated transfer 
controls interact with existing organizational arrangements, accounting structures, 
demands for evaluation and transparency as well as the institutional tug-of-war 
between the legislature, executive, and agencies for strategic control of agency 
priority-setting.  In Georgia, these criteria actually played a far greater role in shaping 
a program structure than strategic planning or the idea of a managerial performance 
contract.   
  
Difficulties in Implementation 
 
 By all accounts, the state has struggled with implementation of its program 
structure.  The problems include: 
 
● A lack of clarity about program definitions and the process through which the 
state would transition to program budgeting.  Fundamentally, almost no 
agency derived its program as part of a strategic planning process.  
 
● Some of the programs, as defined, may “lack integrity”—or it is not entirely 
clear how different activities (and associated expenditures and revenues) are 
assigned to programs.  Although, this report did not audit agency programs 
and thus does not purport to verify this problem, there are a number of 
indications from interviews with staff at all levels of government that this is 
likely to be a serious issue.   
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● Reduced flexibility for agencies because of a combination of stringent 
transfer controls in the appropriations bill, highly differentiated programs, and 
continued restrictions on object class transfers.  From an agency perspective, 
program budgeting just added another level of control on top of the previous 
level of control.  
 
● Conflict between the legislative and executive branches over strategic control 
of agency priorities as well as control over federal and other funds.  
 
Conflicting Demands on the Program Structure 
 
In part, the problem of program budgeting requires a careful assessment of 
how programs are going to be used within the larger system of resource allocation, 
managerial decision-making, and oversight and evaluation.  In this context, the state 
needs to assess when a program should be constrained through the transfer controls 
that enforce legal accountability and when a program (or other budget unit) can be 
simply reported, monitored, and/or evaluated.  The state could also be more creative 
about types of transfer controls and systems of oversight and evaluation. 
 
Evaluation Models, Oversight, and Transparency 
 
 Based on the theory of performance based management and budgeting, 
programs should be associated with result measures and then evaluated for cost-
effective attainment of these results.  Informally, staff throughout government can 
often evaluate performance by looking at trends over time, or assessing performance 
measures in relation to performance targets or benchmarks.  These sorts of 
evaluations, however, suggest program structure that has clear lines of association 
between activities, funding, and sets of results that can be measured in a reasonable 
time frame.   
However, often truly answering underlying questions about program 
performance requires more formal evaluation.  Formal evaluations might examine 
questions of 1) why a program has not achieved desired outcomes; 2) program 
efficiency or cost-effectiveness in achieving outcomes; 3) comparisons between 
programs, activities, or sub-programs; 4) appropriateness or effectiveness of internal 
processes, activities, or sub-programs; 5) comparisons of regional or institutional 
effectiveness, etc.   For both formal and information evaluations, the appropriate units 
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of evaluation are likely to be far more disaggregated than exists in Georgia’s current 
program structure and would likely encompass subprograms, activities, and object 
class level information in the current program structure. 
Systems of transparency are likely to be similar.  A transparent budget system 
suggests the availability of information about agency performance and priorities to 
those external to government.  Being able to see agency allocation of resources at a 
subprogram or even activity level in the current system is likely to improve 
transparency. 
 
Managerial Considerations 
 
 Running directly counter to an evaluation-oriented program structure, a key 
purpose of program-based performance-oriented systems is to provide managerial 
flexibility and discretion.  Further, correctly allocating expenditures (and at times 
non-state fund revenues) to programs presents serious organizational and technical 
challenges.  Programs may cut across organizational lines requiring cost-allocation 
procedures to sort through costs.  Budget directors and program managers have to 
appropriately project demand for services for a particular program as well as potential 
revenues that might be associated with a program.  At times, federal funding systems 
or even state laws and existing state policies have to be harmonized with a program 
budgeting structure (for instance, formula grant programs may not align appropriately 
with a program budgeting structure). Accounting systems have to be aligned to 
accommodate a program structure, and administrators throughout the organization 
have to be trained to appropriately allocate funds.  Failure to appropriately implement 
these systems can lead to a loss of “program integrity.”  For these reasons, a number 
of agencies would like to see a program structure with much larger programs than 
currently exists in Georgia.  
 
Legislative versus Executive and Agency Control 
 
 Although discussions of budget reforms often try to pretend that “politics” 
does not exist – many reforms have failed because they do not recognize and 
accommodate the natural institutional tension between the legislative and executive 
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branches of government.  In Georgia, the executive branch through the Office of 
Planning and Budget has a certain amount of operational oversight of an agency’s 
budget—e.g., it oversees transfers between object classes, programs and 
subprograms, amendment of federal and other funds and so forth.  Thus, the 
executive does not require the budget document to be structured a particular way in 
order to retain power or control over agency activities. 
In Georgia’s current system, the legislature, however, relies on the budget 
document and supporting materials, such as the tracking documents, to prioritize and 
communicate legislative intent.  As a result, the legislature will tend to prefer a more 
disaggregated program structure with stricter transfer controls, while the executive 
and agencies tend to prefer larger programs with looser transfer controls.  (This 
dilemma is not unique to Georgia.)  As a result, the transition to program budgeting 
has become a tug-of-war between the legislature that wants to use control over the 
program structure as an extension of its ability to convey legislative intent and the 
executive and agencies that have to struggle with the managerial and technical 
problems associated with defining program structures.  The executive and agencies, 
however, also express concern about the loss of strategic control (or power) to the 
legislature as a result of program budgeting.  
 
Analysis and Considerations 
 
 A number of tensions have been brought to bear on the program structure in 
Georgia’s budget.  At the most basic level, the programs need to be reviewed to 
clarify how activities and associated expenditures and revenues are assigned to 
different programs and to align programs with a strategic plan.  However, Georgia 
also needs to consider the larger framework in which the program structure is being 
implemented:  this includes an assessment of how programs are going to be used as 
well as an effort to better reconcile the competing political, managerial, evaluation 
oriented, and technical pressures.  
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Some Alternatives: 
 
Adjust the transfer controls:  Much of the current tension associated with program 
budgeting is result of the transfer controls.  Transfer controls in the appropriations 
bill typically have the benefit of ensuring accuracy in accounting for expenditures at 
the program level; and are a source of legislative control over funding.  Transfer 
controls over object classes are used by the executive to monitor agency operations 
and are a source of executive control over agency activities.   
 
These controls, however, are not fixed, nor are the processes through which transfers 
are monitored.  The legislature could adjust transfer controls associated with 
programs to focus on programs where there is a particular concern about control and 
relax the controls where the legislature trusts the agency to manage the funds in 
accordance with legislative intent.  The legislature could move between different 
groupings of programs based on these concerns.  Such shifts though would have to be 
tempered by agency ability to accurately account for funds at different program 
levels.   
 
Adjust the process of oversight:  Rather than adjusting the transfer controls, the 
legislature and executive could streamline the process of oversight for transfers.  For 
instance, the legislature could allow legislative staff to sign off on transfers rather 
than referring decisions to the full Fiscal Affairs Committee.  Alternatively, the Fiscal 
Affairs Committee could meet more regularly.  Or the state could develop systems 
where the legislature is notified and transfers are considered approved unless the 
legislative staff or selected legislators request additional information or protest the 
transfer within a certain period of time.  There are a number of variations.   
 
Similarly, OPB could adjust the monitoring of transfer controls over object classes to 
ensure that some transfers are only monitored while others require explicit approval.   
 
Switch from ex ante control to ex post control:  Currently, Georgia is relying heavily 
on ex ante (or up front) control over agency spending rather than ex post (or after the 
fact) control.  Ex post systems, which are the premise of performance based 
budgeting, rely more heavily on evaluation and remedial action for poor performance 
rather than controls over spending up front, particularly by the legislature.  Virginia 
provides a good example of such a system. 
 
In an ex post system of control, Georgia might have a well defined and disaggregated 
program structure in the appropriations bill, but the executive branch and agencies 
would be given extensive authority to transfer funds as long as it was in keeping with 
legislative intent.  Programs would also be associated with key performance measures 
that were important to legislators, the executive, and the public at large.  At the end of 
the fiscal year, the legislature would commission evaluations to assess a host of 
implementation questions, including whether agency decisions are in keeping with 
legislative intent.  In such a system, expectations would be set beforehand through the 
budget process; however, agencies would have significant flexibility to adapt.  
Control would be exerted through evaluation and potential legislative remedial action 
An Analysis of the Implementation of  
Program Budgeting in Georgia   
 
 
 x
if performance was poor or legislative intent was ignored.  Georgia has elements of 
such a system in place; however, the state would likely have to invest in a greater 
legislative capacity to evaluate and would have to develop performance measures 
with legislative input. 
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I. Budgeting in Georgia 
Introduction 
 In 2003, the newly elected governor of Georgia Sonny Perdue initiated a 
budgetary reform called Prioritized Program Planning and Budgeting (PPPB), now 
renamed to Prioritized Program Budgeting (PPB).  This reform transitioned the state 
from appropriating by line item to appropriating by program and further required 
agencies to rank order programs by priority and to develop strategic plans and 
performance measures.  As such, PPB closely resembles a variety of “program based, 
performance oriented budgets” in other states.   
 This report focuses on the process and challenges associated with the first 
part of the reform – the designation and development of a program budget structure.  
While there is voluminous information about the development and use of 
performance measures, e.g., Hatry 1999; Poister & Streib 1999; Kittredge & Kissler 
1998; Joyce 1999, 2003, there are few resources to help guide states through the 
process of building the initial programmatic “platform.”  This initial step, which was 
first comprehensively implemented in the fiscal year (FY) 2006 budget year, has 
proved more challenging for Georgia than was perhaps anticipated.  This report is 
meant to help the various state budget and program officers in Georgia reflect on their 
current transition from line item to program budgets as well as to provide a resource 
for other states considering a similar transition.   
  
Background 
 Understanding Georgia’s transformation and current dilemmas requires some 
familiarity with Georgia’s budget process, traditions, and previous budget formats, as 
well as the context within which this reform was initiated.    
 
Budget Process and Recent Changes 
 Georgia’s budget process has traditionally been managed by the Governor’s 
Office of Planning and Budget (OPB).  In the early summer, OPB issues budget 
instructions to the agencies for both a mid-year “amended budget” as well as for the 
up-coming fiscal year’s regular budget.  These budget requests are typically due at 
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the beginning of September.  In the fall, OPB and the Governor’s staff develop the 
executive budget report which is presented to the legislature in early January in 
conjunction with the beginning of the 40 day legislative session.1    
Georgia’s legislature then considers both the amended and general budgets.  
Once they have signed off on the budget, the agencies develop an operating budget, 
which serves as their work plan for the year.  OPB is heavily involved in monitoring 
the movement of funds within the agency during the year.  When the budget year 
ends, the Department of Audits and Accounts (DOAA)—an agency overseen by the 
legislature—conducts financial audits.  During the year, DOAA may conduct 
performance audits at the request of the legislators (House Budget Office 2006; Carl 
Vinson Institute 2005).  In 2004, the state also created a State Accounting Office in 
order to handle the development of the financial reports at the end of the year, 
maintain the state’s financial accounting systems, and improve internal control 
(Georgia State Accounting Office 2006).  The state fiscal year runs from July 1st to 
June 30th.  
The transition to program budgeting occurred in conjunction with several 
major shifts in governmental control.  First, the executive and legislative branches 
transitioned from being controlled entirely by Democrats to being controlled entirely 
by Republicans—for the first time in over a century.  The transition also was 
accompanied by institutional changes.  Prior to 2003, the legislature had a single 
budget office, but in 2003, the legislature was split with the Democrats continuing to 
hold the House and Republicans controlling the Senate and the Executive.  This 
change precipitated a split in the legislative budget office with each chamber of the 
General Assembly creating its own office.  By 2004, both chambers had become 
Republican but the two budget offices did not then re-merge.  There is now a House 
Budget Office (HBO) and a Senate Budget and Evaluation Office (SBEO).   
The new staff in these legislative budget offices, and the Senate staff in 
particular, took a more active role in the budget process.  According to a number of 
budget and agency staff who served in positions on both the legislative and executive 
                                                          
1 By law the Governor must present the budget within five days after the start of the legislative 
session.  The session is 40 legislative days not calendar days. 
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sides in the 1990s, prior to 2003, the executive dominated the budget process.  The 
legislature focused on “special projects” for legislative districts and at times on minor 
policy changes, but most of the dialogue over budgeting took place between the 
agencies, the Governor and his policy staff, and OPB.   
 
Legal Framework and the Traditional Budget Format 
These shifts in the political and institutional arrangements are important 
because they both precipitated program budgeting and have created challenges in its 
implementation.  In particular, the legislative involvement in program budgeting 
represents a major departure from previous efforts to implement performance 
reforms.  In 1993, the state passed the Budget Accountability and Planning Act, and 
in subsequent budgets, performance measures as well as various program and even 
subprogram designations for each agency were reflected in the Governor’s budget 
reports. (e.g., see the FY 1999-2002 Budget Reports).  However, by 2003 the initial 
efforts at the reform had waned after having little effect on actual agency operations.  
In the FY 2004 amended Governor’s report, agency budgets were only reported by 
“object class” or line item and by a few functional areas (see Figure 1).  Throughout 
this initial implementation, the legislature never adopted a program budget nor fully 
developed systems to use performance information in making budget decisions.2   
With functional or line item budgeting, the legislature and others external to 
the agency cannot see what the agencies do in a general sense, nor can they assess the 
actual cost of various agency activities.  For instance, in Figure 1 the Governor’s 
budget request for the Department of Corrections shows a cut of $13 million in 
personal services.  However, it is not clear which programs or purposes out of a $904 
million budget this shift will affect.   
The process that the legislature had used since the 1970s focused on object 
classes as well as a list of “amendments” or marginal changes for each agency which 
it approved or disproved at the agency level not at a programmatic level (see Figure 
2).   Again,  it’s  hard  to  match  these  marginal changes with the bigger picture.  For  
 
                                                          
2 There were efforts such as the creation of the legislative Budget Responsibility and Oversight 
Committee, but these were never fully implemented.  
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FIGURE 1: EXAMPLE OF A PREVIOUS BUDGET FORMAT, GOVERNOR’S REPORT 
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FIGURE 2:  EXAMPLE OF BUDGET AMENDMENTS (GOVERNOR’S REPORT) 
 
 
 
  
 
instance, in FY04 (Figure 2), the state proposed to cut counselors; however, a 
legislator would not know if this cut affected probation services, prison services, 
transition centers, detention centers or any other program run by the agency.  
Also, in the appropriations bill (Figure 3), the legal weight of the budget fell 
on the object classes—agencies were locked in to the object class amounts and were 
only permitted to spend up to 2 percent over the state funds budgeted for each line 
item (keeping the bottom line for the agency the same).  Alternatively, they could 
return to the legislature or the legislature’s Fiscal Affairs Committee to request a 
transfer, but the legislature only met for three months at the beginning of the year, 
and  the  Fiscal  Affairs  Committee  typically met only once a year in the intervening  
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FIGURE 3: APPROPRIATIONS BILL, HB 1180 (FY04 AMENDED BUDGET) 
Section 9 – Department of Corrections    
    
Objects of Expenditure 
Personal Services 
Regular Operating Expenses 
Travel 
Motor Vehicle Purchases 
Equipment 
Computer Charges 
Real Estate Rentals 
Telecommunications 
Per Diem and Fees 
Contracts 
Utilities 
Health Services Purchases 
Court Costs 
County Subsidy 
County Subsidy for Jails 
Central Repair Fund 
Payments to Central State Hospital for Meals 
Payments to Central State Hospital for Utilities 
Payments to Public Safety for Meals 
Inmate Release Fund 
UGA College of Veterinary Medicine Contracts 
Minor Construction Fund 
  Total Funds
$545,711,723 
$64,058,000 
$2,002,328 
$1,809,244 
$2,491,894 
$5,681,517 
$7,792,861 
$7,178,331 
$42,637 
$76,074,263 
$26,309,405 
$131,109,077 
$1,300,000 
$37,726,400 
$15,350,000 
$1,093,624 
$4,268,025 
$1,627,150 
$577,160 
$1,450,000 
$449,944 
$1,024,200
    
Functional Units 
Administration Division 
Executive Operations 
Facilities Division 
Human Resources Division 
Probation Division 
Programs Division 
 State Funds 
$17,682,432 
$30,351,748 
$631,956,089 
$11,953,841 
$78,521,607 
$135,874,434 
Total Funds
$17,682,432 
$30,801,748 
$647,609,708 
$11,953,841 
$82,741,411 
$144,338,643
   
Fund Allocations 
Total Funds 
Federal Funds 
Intra-State Agency Funding 
Non-State Funds 
State Funds 
 Fund Amount 
$935,127,783 
$10,116,249 
$450,000 
$18,221,383 
$906,340,151 
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period.3  Finally, each agency was audited back to these agency level object class 
categories.  Agencies were not similarly restricted by any “functional categories” that 
might also be reported in the appropriations bill.   
This form of budgeting forced agencies to think upfront about how a task 
would be performed, for instance the agency had to decide early on if they would 
provide a new service by hiring a new person, contracting out, or paying on a per 
diem basis, but within each input category, the agencies had extensive flexibility to 
determine priorities and move funds to meet the agencies’ perceived areas of need.  
For instance, the Department of Corrections could prioritize the allocation of its $544 
million in personal services budget between administration, prisons, detention 
centers, transition centers, boot camps, and a variety probation services as long as it 
did not exceed the legislatively specified amounts for personal services overall.  OPB 
monitored and approved all transfers between object classes and functional categories 
and further had accumulated institutional knowledge about the on-going operations of 
agencies.  As a result, OPB and by extension the Governor had some degree of 
operational control over agency activities.  However, again, to those external to the 
agency or OPB, it is not clear how the agency is prioritizing its personal service 
funds.  
 
Federal and Other Funds 
Another issue in this budget was the allocation of federal funds and other 
funds raised by the agency.  Much as with state general funds, lack of a program 
structure meant that the purposes behind funding streams was not clear.  Also, 
agencies do not appear to have been required to be particularly accurate in their 
projections of federal or other funds and were allowed to amend in these funds to the 
budget bill throughout the year.  
Table 1 shows the difference between the funds “budgeted” in the 
appropriations bill relative to the total funds that were budgeted by the end of the 
year.   During  the  year,  the  agency,  with approval from OPB, would “amend in” or  
                                                          
3 By statute they are supposed to meet at least quarterly (see §28-5-25 of the Georgia Code 
(Unannotated)).  
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TABLE 1: COMPARISON OF ORIGINAL AMOUNTS BUDGETED VERSUS FINAL AMOUNTS 
Georgia  
(from CAFR) 
Original  
(Budgeted Amt) 
Final  
(After Amendments) 
 
Variance  
 
% 
FY03     
State Appropriation     
Regular $15,307,983,094 $15,315,646,346 $7,663,252 0% 
Lottery $625,000,000 $665,037,766 $40,037,766 6% 
Tobacco $173,002,372 $185,622,923 $12,620,551 7% 
Federal Revenues $6,536,341,100 $8,621,512,245 $2,085,171,145 32% 
Other Revenues Retained $5,394,646,037 $6,664,250,642 $1,269,604,605 24% 
Total Revenues $28,036,972,603 $31,452,069,922 $3,415,097,319 12% 
     
FY04     
State Appropriation     
Regular  $15,307,459,296 $15,203,968,291 $(103,491,005) -1% 
Lottery $691,795,656 $700,839,757 $9,044,101 1% 
Tobacco $175,080,760 $174,384,699 $(696,061) 0% 
Federal Revenues $7,152,378,659 $10,770,534,647 $3,618,155,988 51% 
Other Revenues Retained $5,165,293,804 $7,651,867,389 $2,486,573,585 48% 
Total Revenues $28,492,008,175 $34,501,594,783 $6,009,586,608 21% 
     
FY05     
State Appropriation     
Regular $15,448,164,768 $15,625,848,315 $177,683,547 1% 
Lottery $771,553,228 $776,892,107 $5,338,879 1% 
Tobacco $156,370,000 $156,370,000 $  -   0% 
Federal Revenues $7,704,412,702 $11,039,161,593 $3,334,748,891 43% 
Other Revenues Retained $4,731,916,530 $7,597,466,604 $2,865,550,074 61% 
Total Revenues $28,812,417,228 $35,195,738,619 $6,383,321,391 22% 
Average Underestimate of Federal Funds     42% 
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TABLE 2: BUDGETED VERSUS FINAL AMOUNTS OF FEDERAL FUNDS COMPARISON OF GEORGIA TO 
OTHER STATES (000) 
 Original 
 (Budgeted Amt) 
Final  
(After Amendments) 
 
Variance  
 
% 
Georgia      
FY 03  $        6,536,341   $             8,621,512   $                2,085,171  32% 
FY 04  $        7,152,378   $           10,770,534   $                3,618,156  51% 
FY 05  $        7,704,412   $           11,039,161   $                3,334,749  43% 
Average       42% 
Virginia      
FY 03  $        3,808,380   $             4,525,866   $                   717,486  19% 
FY 04  $        3,791,860   $             5,123,470   $                1,331,610  35% 
FY 05  $        4,445,322   $             5,011,642   $                   566,320  13% 
Average       22% 
Texas      
FY 03  $       14,364,098   $           18,381,663   $                4,017,565  28% 
FY 04  $       17,877,709   $           19,662,905   $                1,785,196  10% 
FY 05  $       17,489,688   $           20,931,657   $                3,441,969  20% 
Average       19% 
South Carolina     
FY 03  $        4,622,626   $             5,599,917   $                   977,291  21% 
FY 04  $        5,056,463   $             6,009,629   $                   953,166  19% 
FY 05  $        5,725,125   $             6,343,617   $                   618,492  11% 
Average       17% 
North Carolina      
FY 03  $        6,632,554   $             8,258,591   $                1,626,037  25% 
FY 04  $        7,334,712   $             8,814,136   $                1,479,424  20% 
FY 05  $        7,812,271   $             9,913,998   $                2,101,727  27% 
Average       24% 
Maryland*     
FY 03  $        5,186,037   $             5,691,478   $                   505,441  10% 
FY 04  $        5,462,179   $             6,297,649   $                   835,470  15% 
FY 05  $        5,689,469   $             6,251,842   $                   562,373  10% 
Average    12% 
*Note: Maryland allocates some federal funds under "special funds"& "general fund" that are not shown here; however, these 
amounts are small. Source documents for this table are the Comprehensive Annual Financial Reports for each state. 
 
 
increase their federal funds as they received them.  Although all states try to be 
conservative in their projections of these external funding sources, Georgia has been 
off by as much as 51 percent for federal funds and by as much as 61 percent for other 
revenues.  Looking at several other southern states for purposes of comparison in 
Table 2, Georgia’s underestimations are almost double those of the next highest state.  
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II. The Transition to Program Budgeting 
 
The Governor’s Proposal: Prioritized Program Planning and 
Budgeting 
  
The most recent effort to transition to program budgeting was initiated by 
Governor Perdue in his 2004 budget instructions.  When Governor Perdue came into 
office in 2003, he was immediately faced with a seven percent decline in real 
revenues for FY03 (a three percent decline or $380 million shortfall in current 
dollars).  In FY02, revenues had also declined by 7 percent (Bourdeaux 2006b).  The 
initial transition to program budgeting was intended to help the new executive staff 
handle the shortfall through a better understanding of the purposes for which state 
funds were being spent.  Program budgeting with a performance orientation was also 
viewed as a “best practice” and one that would presumably reorient managers away 
from inputs towards results.4   
The 2004 new budget instructions required agencies to prepare a strategic 
plan with performance measures linked to statewide priorities, as well as to develop a 
budget based on programs.  According to the state’s strategic planning documents, 
each agency had to identify its core businesses (see Figure 4) with associated 
performance measures and indicators.  A subset of these core businesses would be 
programs which would be identified in the “Agency Annual Business Plan.”    
Each of these programs was expected to be attached to a set of results 
measures and agencies were required to rank the importance of these programs in a 
“prioritization process.”  This ranking and program designation process remained 
internal to the executive branch and the appropriations bill only reflected the object 
class expenditures.  In the FY05 Governor’s budget report, each agency reported 
programs and performance measures as well as the object class results.  Although the 
General Assembly listed the programs in the appropriations bills, the legal burden, in 
the form of the 2 percent restriction on transfer of state funds, continued to be on the 
object  class  designations.   In  FY06,  the  Governor’s  budget again reported a more  
 
 
                                                          
4 Interviews with GA20 & GA25. 
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FIGURE 4:  STRATEGIC PLANNING INSTRUCTIONS 
 
 
From:  Governor's Office of Planning and Budget, Georgia Merit System, and Georgia 
Technology Authority 2004. 
FIGURE 5:  GOVERNOR’S REPORT AND THE SHIFT TO PROGRAM BUDGETING IN FY 2006 
 
 
 
Figure 5 continues next page… 
FIGURE 5 (CONTINUED).  GOVERNOR’S REPORT AND THE SHIFT TO PROGRAM BUDGETING IN FY 2006 
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refined program structure.  See Figure 5 for the Department of Corrections budget as 
presented in the Governor’s FY 06 Budget Report.  
 
The Senate Change: Program Budgeting 
 
In FY06, the state fully transitioned to a program budget when the Senate 
made two major changes which were ultimately adopted in the final FY06 
appropriations bill: 
 
1) The Senate switched the legal requirements to place the 2 percent 
restriction on programs rather than object classes and added a $250,000 
restriction (2 percent or $250,000 whichever was less)5 on the transfer of 
funds between programs.   
 
2) The final bill also reported federal and “other” state funds as well as 
general fund allocations at the program level and attempted to constrain 
agencies to spending these monies based on these appropriated amounts.  
 
The implication of this switch was that any changes over 2 percent or 
$250,000 across programs for state funds would require the agency to submit a 
request to the legislative Fiscal Affairs Committee for approval.  Further, agencies 
would now be audited for spending compliance based on programs rather than object 
classes.   
The Director of the Senate Budget and Evaluation Office had long been 
interested in changing the type of information presented to legislators to one that 
moved away from the input based object class system to one based on purposes.  
Further, SBEO saw an evolving role for the legislative budget office – away from 
focusing on incremental changes at the margins each year to a system built on budget 
analyst evaluation of programmatic effectiveness.6  While the executive offices saw 
program budgeting as a platform for focusing agencies on results, the SBEO saw 
program budgets as defining the appropriate units for more in depth evaluation and 
oversight.  Importantly, program budgets would also allow legislators more control 
over the strategic choices made by agencies, where the previous line item budgets 
                                                          
5 Medicaid was excluded from this requirement. 
6 The Senate changed the name of its budget office to the Senate Budget and Evaluation Office to 
reflect this change in outlook.  
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only allowed control only over a variety of inputs (Bourdeaux and Fernandes 
forthcoming).  
 
Observations about Implementation Problems in the State 
 
 This report is based on interviews with agency staff, representing 10 of the 15 
major departments (as well as some smaller agencies), OPB and executive staff, 
Senate Budget and Evaluation Office staff, staff in the Office the State Auditor, and 
several previous state budget staff who are still involved in state budgeting in external 
roles, as well as personal experience working as an executive loan with the Senate 
Budget and Evaluation Office on FY05 Amended and FY06 budget development.   
Many interviewed indicated they supported the transition to program 
budgeting in concept; however by all indications, the state has struggled with 
implementation.  At the most fundamental level, there are somewhat different 
concepts about what program budgeting should be.  Agencies in particular perceive 
the purpose of program budgeting as giving them increased flexibility to manage in 
return for performance.  This view is not entirely shared by the legislative or 
executive branches, which are more concerned with the use of programs for focusing 
agencies on key public purposes, prioritization of these purposes, and control.   
In terms of implementation, the overarching problem has been putting 
together a systematic process for implementing program budgeting reform.  The 
problems in implementation include the following: 
 
● The state started into program budgeting without an accounting system that 
could support many agencies’ program structures.  This issue was addressed 
in the summer of 2006, but this shift occurred at the end of the fiscal year in 
which the transition to program budgets had occurred.   
 
● There has been a lack of clarity about program definitions and the process 
through which the state would transition to program budgeting.  Examples of 
this include instructions about creating an “administration” program.  This 
program was initially not an option for agencies(see Governor’s Office of 
Planning and Budget, Georgia Merit System, and Georgia Technology 
Authority 2004), but then it became required.   
 
Similarly, the legislature, executive branch, and agencies did not begin the 
transition with an agreed upon process for establishing a program structure 
An Analysis of the Implementation of  
Program Budgeting in Georgia   
 
 
 16 
for each agency.7  As a result, program structure for some agencies has 
continued to shift each year, as the legislative branch, and the agencies and 
executive branch struggle over the program structure. 8    
 
Although one of the purported ideas behind program budgeting was to align 
major agency operations with a strategic plan, most agencies appear not to 
have used a strategic planning process to develop programs or to link 
programs to strategic plans and outcome measures.9   
 
Several of the larger agencies report being surprised by the legislative shift of 
the 2 percent or $250,000 transfer controls from object classes to programs.  
As a result, they initially proposed more programs than they might have if 
they knew that their flexibility would be curtailed.10 
 
● Some of the programs, as defined, may “lack integrity” – or it is not entirely 
clear which funds should be allocated to which program.  Although, this 
report did not “audit” agency programs and thus does not purport to verify 
this problem, indications of this problem include:  
 
Some agencies began program budgeting without a solid idea of either 
expenditures or non-state revenues associated with a particular programs.11  
This problem may have been exacerbated if the agency has new programs 
which cut across previous budgeting, organizational and/or accounting 
categories.   
 
Some agency budget directors report concerns that administrators at lower 
levels of their organization have not been trained in how to appropriately 
allocate funds to programs.   
 
                                                          
7 See New Mexico’s process.  Other states struggle with this problem, as well, and a failure to 
receive cross-branch endorsement of a strategy often means the reform is not accepted by the 
legislature and eventually falters (see South Carolina). 
8 A particular problem has been the Department of Human Resources program structure which can 
be observed shifting each year from 2004.  Also, this problem can be observed by looking at 
different documents during the FY 2006 debates over the judicial branch and the Department of 
Education. 
9 I was only able to identify one (the Georgia Department of Revenue) that truly went through a 
“textbook” strategic planning process.  Although some agencies are now adding in strategic 
planning and performance only three agencies initially (Revenue, Pardons and Paroles, and 
perhaps Transportation) had a vision of how programs linked to core businesses and performance.  
Almost all of the other agencies, and to some degree the Department of Transportation as well 
report using accounting, organizational, revenues streams or other very pragmatic criteria to select 
programs in order to try to minimize the impact of the transition to program budgeting on their 
agency operations.   
10 DHR, GDC, DJJ have asked to consolidate programs.   Surprise noted by many interviewed: 
GA23, GA24, GA27, GA28, GA32. 
11 One indication of this is the significant number of “bookkeeping” and “overrun” shifts requested 
through Fiscal Affairs transfers. 
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Some agencies indicate that they are shifting funds to programs through 
backdoor transfers.  They are “reclassifying” expenditures from one program 
to another (typically to programs with extra money).  On the one hand, this 
could be a simple product of initial misestimates about program funding 
levels.  On the other hand, such shifts avoid having to report transfers to OPB 
or Fiscal Affairs and can be abused.  
 
Cost accounting techniques being used by agencies involve assumptions that 
can be gamed to place more expenditures in one program or another (e.g., 
they will allocate all of office space or all of a person to one program rather 
than splitting between programs based on actual usage or activities).  
Although this decision-rule may be valid in some contexts, there is no 
oversight or common agreement on how to allocate funds.  A result of this 
sort of cost allocation can cause some programs to look more expensive than 
they actually are and others to look cheaper.   
 
Some agencies report difficulty projecting service demand (e.g., number of 
prisoners in the prison system, number of mental health patients) and the 
impact of demand on the level of funding required for each program.  In other 
cases, agencies report difficulty projecting federal or other agency level 
revenues. 
 
● In its current form, program budgeting has resulted in a loss of flexibility for 
agencies.  The increasing rigidity of the budget has occurred for several 
reasons. 
 
The legislature tightened transfer controls from 2 percent of funds in any 
category to 2 percent or $250,000 whichever is less.12  Further the legislature 
attempted to bring federal and other funds under this control as well (see 
discussion below) where agencies were accustomed to extensive flexibility in 
how to use these funds. 
 
OPB continues to require that agencies report transfers by object class.  Thus, 
agencies are not only constrained in moving funds by program but by object 
class within each program as well.13   In part, this appears to be a problem 
because OPB lacks confidence in the integrity of programs.   
 
Agency staff, and in particular budget staff in the larger agencies, felt that 
both OPB and the legislative budget staff fail to recognize the technical 
complexity associated with having to shift money across multiple budget and 
accounting categories.  This challenge is discussed in more detail in the next 
chapter.    
 
                                                          
12 There are some exceptions for the Medicaid program. 
13 All major agencies as well as OPB staff reported this issue.  
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Legislative involvement and the restrictions on agency flexibility have 
significantly increased the number Fiscal Affairs requests.  Agencies 
complain that Fiscal Affairs does not meet enough.14  Legislative staff say 
that they have not been asked to meet more frequently by OPB. 
 
Federal Funds 
 
There was and continues to be some disagreement over the level of control 
that applies to federal and “other” funds.  Traditionally, agencies have had significant 
flexibility to “amend in” federal and other funds to their base budget as they receive 
the funds throughout the fiscal year.  The agencies benefited by making very 
conservative projections because they then retained control of the funds (although 
constrained by federal and state law and regulations).  The funds were not subject to 
comprehensive review by the legislature as part of the budget process even though 
federal funds may make up almost one-third of the state’s budget (see Table 1).   
With the transition to program budgeting, the legislature tried to control this 
practice by adding in federal funds based on previous year’s expenditures, and in the 
amended budget, recognizing and allocating federal funds that had been “amended 
in” by the agency and executive during the periods when the legislature was not in 
session.  This effort created several problems.  In some cases where the legislature 
recognized funds that had been “amended in,” the legislature ended up appropriating 
funds to programs where the federal money had already been obligated or allocated to 
another program.  A memo issued by the GA Department of Law indicated that the 
legislature did not have the authority to retroactively move federal funds that had 
been recognized by the executive and agencies between the legislative sessions 
(Ballard 2006).  The Office of Planning and Budget then shifted these funds back to 
their original position. 
The legislature also allocated federal funds to agencies that received these 
funds as a “transfer” payment from another agency, shifting authority for the funds 
from the agency that the federal government recognized as responsible to the agency 
that would ultimately receive the funds.  For instance, the Department of Labor 
receives federal Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) job placement 
                                                          
14 GA27, GA36, GA31, GA26, GA30, GA37. 
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funds from the Department of Human Resources to help place welfare recipients.  
DHR enters into a performance contract with DOL to provide employment services 
for its clients – the TANF funds are reimbursements for services rendered.  When the 
legislature forced the funds to be placed in DOL, then the money was no longer for 
services rendered per se but was an automatic allocation.  Also, DHR enters into 
contracts with the federal government over use of these funds and is recognized as the 
“cognizant agency” for such purposes.  With legislative allocations, DHR loses 
control over the ways that the funds are spent.  Although the implications of this 
transfer are not entirely clear, if not carefully considered, it has the potential to create 
a conflict between the requirements at the federal level and the state appropriations 
bill.  Several agencies returned to the legislative Fiscal Affairs committee to shift 
federal funds out of their budgets to the agency that actually received the funds from 
the federal government. 15 
The legislature also attempted to allocate federal and other agency revenue 
sources by program rather than at the agency level.  This also created confusion 
because agencies did not have a good understanding of how they allocated revenues 
at the program level and did not have the accounting system in place to effectively 
track funds by program.  Agencies also argue that they are not always able to project 
federal funds accurately.  For FY06, the state agencies were locked into these 
program categories across both state general funds and federal funds.  For FY07, the 
Georgia Attorney General’s office issued a ruling on the “flex” language in HB 1027.  
This opinion interpreted the restrictions on transfers between programs to only apply 
to state funds and not federal.  The effect of this latter opinion is that federal funds 
continue to be largely controlled by the agencies and OPB for FY07 (Ballard 2006a, 
2006b).   
Legislative bodies asking agencies to more accurately project and allocate 
their federal funds is not uncommon.  For instance, in the case studies, at the end of 
this report, both Virginia and New Mexico reported recent executive-legislative 
                                                          
15 These changes were corrected in the Fiscal Affairs Committee meetings (see Fiscal Affairs 
Transfer Requests: Recommended to be processed by amendment, June 9, 2006).  This problem 
might have been resolved by changing how these transfers are recognized in the appropriations 
bill. 
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debates over federal funds.  The Virginia legislature required agencies to more 
carefully estimate and report federal funds for programs in the appropriations bill, 
and the legislative staff in New Mexico noted that they would adjust agency and 
program federal funds levels based on their internal staff analyses of anticipated 
funds.  The analysis in Table 2 suggests that Georgia agencies could more accurately 
project federal funds.  
On the other hand, legislative misallocations or mistakes can create serious 
problems for agencies particularly when they are coupled with stringent transfer 
controls.  In both New Mexico and Virginia the legislative and executive branches 
have systems in place that allow agencies to adapt in a timely way.16  In New Mexico, 
while the staff wants accurate reporting, the executive branch has significant 
autonomy to move or amend in federal funds.  In Virginia, programs and 
subprograms are reported at a detailed level in the appropriations bill, but the 
legislature allows the executive significant authority to move funds—and explicit 
authority to move funds if necessary to be in compliance with federal law.  The 
Virginia legislature then periodically asks the Joint Legislative Audit and Review 
Committee (JLARC) to evaluate executive program transfers associated with certain 
agencies to ensure that the agency or executive have not violated legislative intent or 
authority.   
                                                          
16 I have not verified with agencies how well these work.  In Virginia, the executive staff 
perceived that they had significant flexibility up front, but were held accountable through JLARC 
reviews.  
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III. Conceptual Dilemmas in Program Budgeting 
 
Why Use Program Budgeting? 
 
Program budgeting (typically combined with a performance measurement 
orientation) is expected to have the following benefits: 
 
1) Increases transparency by showing the relationship between funding and 
public purposes. 
 
2) Gives managers freedom from restrictive control over inputs. 
 
3) Provides a platform for attaching outcomes to key public services and for 
evaluating the relationship between funding and outcomes.17 
 
Budget reforms also need to ensure that they do not undermine existing 
systems that provide controls over potential “waste, fraud, and abuse.”  Unlike the 
private sector, which can focus heavily on efficiency, public systems generally 
require a heavier emphasis on control.  Public organizations are influenced by public 
perception about how public dollars are being spent, and public organizations do not 
face competitive pressures to enforce efficiency.  A number of states use some form 
of program budgeting, including Virginia, Pennsylvania, New Mexico, Texas, 
Oregon, and Iowa.  Case studies are included in the appendix.   
Program budgeting has its origins in the 1960s with a reform known as 
Planning, Programming Budgeting Systems (PPBS).  This form of budgeting was 
intended to reorient decision-making towards a planning focus, allowing top 
managers to evaluate the efficiency of existing strategies in achieving broad based 
objectives and to assess public expenditures across previous budgetary and 
organizational silos (Wildavsky 1969; Schick 1966).  This reform wilted in part from 
the magnitude of its ambition – it required complex analysis and significant 
institutional change to support it (Schick 1973; Mosher 1969).    
                                                          
17 These benefits are described in interviews with staff in New Mexico, Florida, and Texas.  Also, 
these benefits were reflected in comments from budget staff in Georgia about reasoning behind the 
transition to program budgets.  Similar discussion associated with performance based budgeting 
(which relies on a program platform) are described in (Government Finance Officers Association 
2005; Joyce 1999, 2003; Hatry 1999). 
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Since then, budgeting has been influenced by ideas surrounding performance 
based budgeting, a reform that focuses both on performance measures or outcomes 
and on managerial entrepreneurialism.  The theory behind performance based 
budgeting is that managers should be held accountable for results, but should be 
allowed to shift inputs as needed in order to achieve these results (Hatry 1999; Broom 
1995; Joyce 1999).  Performance based budgeting has become interlinked with 
program budgeting because of the intuitive idea that programs are the level at which 
managers should be given financial flexibility to achieve results.  For instance, Texas, 
New Mexico and Florida all developed their program structures, in theory, starting 
with agency strategic planning and then conceptualizing “programs” as the activities 
or strategies through which agencies achieve their goals and objectives.  This format 
is described in the GFOA documents on best practices as well (Government Finance 
Officers Association 2005).   
 
Legislative Considerations 
 
Presumably performance based budgeting alone could occur at an agency 
rather than program level in conjunction with “lump sum” budgets.  For instance, 
states such as Iowa have developed systems of performance contracts with agency 
heads.  In return for maximum flexibility, agency heads agree to produce certain 
results and achieve a certain level of savings.  However, in Georgia, the budget 
offices and elected officials have been reluctant to turn over millions or even billions 
of dollars to agency staff to make decisions without a more disaggregated level of 
control.  The legislators and legislative staff appear to be also interested in using 
program designations to clarify actual levels of spending on state services, evaluate at 
this level, and to strengthen the legislative ability to set strategic priorities.  
 
Challenges in Program Budgeting 
 
Although seemingly a simple shift, the actual designation of a program 
structure for the state lies at the cross section of several competing agendas as well as 
a series of technical and organizational challenges for agency staff.  The remainder of 
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this report presents an analysis of the expectations and challenges associated with 
program budgeting.   
Defining “a program” for budgetary purposes is conceptually more complex 
that most people realize.  Although significant attention has been given to policy 
criteria linked to strategic planning, program definitions in actuality also need to 
accommodate: 
 
1) Varying levels of control and accountability. 
 
2) Demand for transparency and links to evaluation. 
 
3) Technical and managerial concerns. 
 
 
Linking Programs to Strategic Planning Processes 
 
What is a Program? 
  
Most states begin their program based performance oriented budgeting 
process by attempting to define programs in relations to a strategic plan.  Texas 
provides one of the clearest examples where agencies were instructed to identify 
mission, goals, objectives and outcomes and then the strategies or “programs” that 
would be associated with attainment of those outcomes and objectives (see Texas 
Legislative Budget Board 2004).  Louisiana, New Mexico, and Virginia also provide 
significant guidance in how to link strategic plans to budgets:  see New Mexico 
Legislative Finance Committee 2005b, 2005c; Virginia Department of Planning and 
Budget 2003, 2005a, 2005b; and Louisiana Office of Planning and Budget 1999.  
Georgia itself has guidelines as well (Governor's Office of Planning and Budget, 
Georgia Merit System, and Georgia Technology Authority 2004).  
However, Georgia’s experience suggests that most states will quickly find 
that this sort of guidance only provides one piece of the puzzle in developing a 
program structure:  
Georgia’s definition of a program is as follows: 
 
Programs are systematic sets of activities undertaken to carry out an 
agency's core businesses. Programs should be customer- and 
outcome- focused and should result in a positive change for the 
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programs' customers. Programs should address key policy and service 
areas. Decision makers must be able to link budget requests, funding, 
and expenditures to individual programs. (Georgia's Office of 
Planning and Budget, Georgia Merit System, and Georgia 
Technology Authority 2004) 
 
This planning document also allows agencies to define subprograms when 
“programs are large enough or have distinct operational components so that they can 
be divided into two or more subprograms.” (Governor’s Office of Planning and 
Budget, Georgia Merit System, and Georgia Technology Authority [2004], p.17)   
Other states define programs as follows: 
 
● Texas: a “method to achieve goals and objectives.  Formulated from goals 
and objectives a [program] is a means of transforming inputs into outputs and 
ultimately outcomes with the best use of resources.”(Texas Legislative 
Budget Board 2004)   
 
● Virginia: programs are products (“items produced by the agency”) or services 
(“an action that the agency takes to fulfill its mission”). (Virginia Department 
of Planning and Budget 2005a) 18   
 
● New Mexico:  a set of activities undertaken in accordance with a plan of 
action organized to realize identifiable goals and objectives based on 
legislative authorization. (New Mexico Legislative Finance Committee 
2005c)  
 
These definitions of a program provide a basic framework.  The linkage to 
products, services, or outcomes is particularly important.  For instance, in Figure 1, 
the functional categories listed by the Department of Corrections, particularly 
“executive operations,” “administration,” and “human resources,” probably would 
not count as programs under the definitions above because they are not directly 
associated with a distinct end product, service, or outcome.   
Similarly, such criteria suggest identifying activities that produce similar 
products, services, or outcomes and combining them into a single program.   For 
instance, in the Department of Corrections the “State Prisons” program and the 
“Transition Centers” program (a program charged with transitioning prisoners into 
                                                          
18 Technically, Texas refers to “programs” as “strategies,” and Virginia has recently switched to a 
classification system where there are programs and sub-programs which are referred to as “service 
areas.” 
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the community) both are associated with the common and shared outcomes of 
reducing recidivism, protecting public safety, protecting inmate safety, etc.  On these 
grounds, one might argue that they should be combined into a single program.   
Using this criterion, sets of activities that are associated with unique and 
distinct outcomes might be differentiated into separate programs. For instance, in the 
Division of Public Health, the Vital Records program is charged with maintaining 
records of births and deaths, while the “Inspections and Environmental Hazards” 
program is charged with conducting restaurant inspections and environmental hazard 
control.  The activities that make up each program are organizationally separate and 
the outcomes for each are distinct and unique.  Shifting funds between these 
programs usually suggests a trade off in state priorities or outcomes rather than a 
means of optimizing a single outcome (Bourdeaux and Fernandes forthcoming).   
In Georgia the problem quickly emerged that there are different levels and 
types of products, services, and outcomes.  Further the different levels of outcomes 
are associated with levels of legislative versus executive and agency accountability 
and control.  In particular, more disaggregated programs allow the legislature a higher 
level of strategic control, and provide a more effective platform for transparency and 
evaluation.  On the other hand, defining programs at a high level of detail and then 
restricting transfers between programs can create serious technical, managerial, and 
organizational problems for agency managers.  This level of control may also 
undermine the philosophy of a performance oriented system which is intended to give 
managers flexibility in return for results. 
 
Example of the Department of Corrections 
Focusing only on products, services and outcomes can lead to any number of 
types of program structures.  The Department of Corrections programs could be 
divided many ways.  Table 3 gives the actual program/subprogram structure for the 
Department of Corrections.   
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TABLE 3: PROGRAM AND SUBPROGRAM STRUCTURE FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS 
1308 – Administration   
0211 - Bainbridge PSATC  0199 - Probation Detention Centers (continued) 
 0213 - PSATC-Admin Support @ Facilities  0203 - PDC-Plant Operations and Maintenance 
 0217 - PSATC-Counseling  0200 - PDC-Security 
 0216 - PSATC-Education  0158 - Probation Diversion Centers 
 0214 - PSATC-Food Service  0160 - DC-Admin Support @ Facility 
 1234 - PSATC-New Bed Start-up  0163 - DC-Counseling 
 
0215 - PSATC-Plant Operations and 
Maintenance 
 
0164 - DC-Education 
 0212 - PSATC-Security  0161 - DC-Food Service 
1384 - Compensation per General Assembly 
Resolutions 
 
1060 - DC-New Bed Startup 
  0162 - DC-Plant Operations & Maintenance 
0165 - Food and Farm Operations  0159 - DC-Security 
 0166 - F&F-Farm Operations  0219 - Probation Supervision 
 0168 - F&F-Food Distribution Unit  0223 - PS-Community Service 
 0167 - F&F-Food Operations  0224 - PS-Day Reporting Center 
0169 – Health  0227 - PS-Family Violence 
 0172 - H-Dental Health  0221 - PS-Field Supervision 
 0171 - H-Mental Health  0222 - PS-Intensive Probation Supervision 
 0170 - H-Physical Health  0220 - PS-Probation Operations 
0176 - Jail Subsidy  0225 - PS-Savannah Impact 
 
 
0226 - PS-Victim's Services 
0173 - Offender Management  0228 - State Prisons 
 0175 - OM-County Camps  0230 - SP-Admin Support @ Facilities 
 0174 - OM-Inmate Classification  0237 - SP-Chaplaincy 
 0177 - OM-Special Operations  0238 - SP-Counseling 
0178 - Parole Revocation Centers  0242 - SP-Details 
 0180 - PRC-Admin Support @ Facilities  0233 - SP-Diagnostics 
 0187 - PRC-Chaplaincy  0236 - SP-Education 
 0184 - PRC-Counseling  0239 - SP-Fire Services 
 0186 - PRC-Education  0231 - SP-Food Service 
 0181 - PRC-Food Service  0241 - SP-Inmate Construction 
 0183 - PRC-Library  0235 - SP-Library 
 1235 - PRC-New Bed Start-up  0234 - SP-New Bed Start-up 
 0182 - PRC-Plant Operations and Maintenance  0232 - SP-Plant Operations and Maintenance 
 0179 - PRC-Security  0229 - SP-Security 
2002 - Private Prisons   0243 - Transition Centers 
  0245 - TC-Admin Support 
0199 - Probation Detention Centers  0250 - TC-Chaplaincy 
 0201 - PDC-Admin Support @ Facilities  0249 - TC-Counseling 
 0210 - PDC-Chaplaincy  1236 - TC-Details 
 0205 - PDC-Counseling  0248 - TC-Education 
 0209 - PDC-Details  0246 – TC-Food Service 
 0207 - PDC-Education  1064 - TC-New Bed Start-Up 
 0202 - PDC-Food Service  0247 - TC-Plant Operations and Maintenance 
 0204 - PDC-Library  0244 - TC-Security 
 0208 - PDC-New Bed Start-Up   
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Table 4 shows four examples which reflect different types of program structures.  
 
Alternative 1:  This is the current program structure and is primarily based on 
organizational “cost centers.”  As will be discussed in Chapter 4, there are some 
functional categories (food services and health) blended in with programs 
oriented around organizational arrangements.  
 
Alternative 2: This model reflects a higher level of “aggregation” relative to the 
original model.  (States with similar models include New Mexico and Texas.) 
 
Alternative 3:  This model takes the current “subprograms” and turns them into 
programs.  In many cases, these subprograms are services that could easily be 
considered “systematic sets of activities undertaken to carry out an agency's core 
businesses.” For instance, counseling, education, prison industries could be 
considered “programs” that contribute to rehabilitation of offenders.  (States with 
similar models include Virginia and Pennsylvania.)  Some of the programs might 
be considered “functional” such as “new bed start-up” or “plant operations and 
maintenance.”  
 
Alternative 4:  This model is facility based and breaks up the current set of 
programs into each organizational unit responsible for administering the program. 
(States such as Iowa and South Carolina appropriate by facility.) 
 
Each of these alternatives is mostly oriented around programs associated with 
a unique product, service, or outcome.  In effect, they meet the main definition of a 
“program” described above.  However, each has differences in the types of outcomes 
that are germane to the funding stream, each has different political and managerial 
implications, and each has different technical implications as well.  
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TABLE 4:  VARIATIONS IN PROGRAM STRUCTURE 
Alternative 1 (Actual)  Alternative 2 Alternative 3 Alternative 4 
1308 - Administration Administration Administration Administration 
0173 - Offender Management Offender Management Inmate Classification Offender Management 
0211 - Bainbridge PSATC Incarceration Special Operations Jail Subsidy 
0165 - Food and Farm Operations  County Camps Albany Transitional Center  
0169 - Health  Chaplaincy Arrendale State Prison  
0178 - Parole Revocation Centers  Counseling Atlanta Male Transitional Center  
2002 - Private Prisons   Details Augusta State Medical Prison  
0228 - State Prisons  Diagnostics Augusta Transitional Center  
0243 - Transition Centers  Education Autry Pre-Transitional Center  
0199 - Probation Detention Centers  Fire Services Autry State Prison  
0158 - Probation Diversion Centers Community Probation Food Service Baldwin Inmate Boot Camp  
0219 - Probation Supervision  Prison Industries Baldwin State Prison  
0176 - Jail Subsidy Jail Subsidy Library Bostick State Prison  
  New Bed Start-up Bulloch County Correctional Institution  
  
Plant Operations and 
Maintenance 
Burrus Correctional Training Center  
 
  Security Burruss Inmate Boot Camp  
  Community Service Calhoun State Prison  
  Day Reporting Center Central State Hospital  
  Family Violence Central State Prison  
  Field Supervision Clarke County Correctional Institution  
  Intensive Probation Supervision Coastal State Prison  
  Probation Operations Coastal Transitional Center  
  Victim's Services Coffee Correctional Facility  
  Jail Subsidy Colquitt County Correctional Institution  
   Coweta County Correctional Institution  
   D. Ray James Correctional Facility  
   Decatur County Correctional Institution  
   Dodge Boot Camp  
   Dodge State Prison  
   
 
Dooly State Prison  
   
 
Effingham County Correctional 
Institution  
   Floyd County Correctional Institution  
   Georgia State Prison  
   Gwinnett County Correctional Institution  
   Hall County Correctional Institution  
   Hancock State Prison  
   Harris County Correctional Institution  
   Hays Inmate Boot Camp  
   Hays State Prison  
   Homerville State Prison  
   Jefferson County Correctional Institution  
   Johnson State Prison  
   … (All Facilities)  
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Programs and Levels of Control and Accountability 
 
The alternatives above reflect trade offs between who makes decisions about 
strategies to achieve long term outcomes and which outcomes are the focus of 
accountability in the budget process.  The tension over strategic control is noted in 
other states such as New Mexico and Florida and is not one that is easily resolved 
(Florida Office of Program Policy Analysis and Government Accountability 1997).19  
In the FY 07 budget cycle and continuing in the FY 08 cycle, agencies and the 
executive are continuing to try to consolidate program structures, while the legislature 
is resisting.  For instance, the Department of Human Resources, Division of Public 
Health had 30 programs in 2004.  In 2006, they reduced their programs to 22.  In 
2007, they requested a further consolidation to 7 programs, and the legislature 
allowed a reduction to 12 programs. Other agencies are less publicly following suit.   
 
Agency and Executive Preference for Large Programs 
 
Agencies typically prefer Alternative 2 because they then have control over 
strategic choices (it also avoids technical and managerial problems).  Alternative 2 is 
almost a lump sum budget and associates funding with “end-state” or “long term 
outcomes,” such as reduced recidivism among the prisoner population.  What is 
invisible in this sort of program structure is the management or policy strategies used 
to achieve this particular end.  For instance under the incarceration program, does the 
Commissioner decide to focus on transition programs, substance abuse treatment, job 
training, or chaplaincy as a strategy for reducing recidivism?  Such underlying 
“strategies” are associated “short term” or “intermediate outcomes” that lead to the 
end-state or longer term outcomes.  Although presumably performance measures 
could be reported for these shorter term outcomes, based on this particular program 
structure, they would not be reported with their associated funding streams.   
Designating programs at this large a scale also can give agencies and the 
executive leverage with the legislature.  For instance, if the legislature were to cut a 
large program like “incarceration,” they cannot control whether the agency might cut 
                                                          
19 The agency preference for large programs is also described in interviews with New Mexico 
legislative budget staff.  
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prisons in a key legislator’s home district or make cuts in politically popular 
programs.20  The legislative intent behind a cut or increase in funding may also be 
lost.  The legislature may want to reduce funding for education programs within the 
incarceration program—but because the cut is only reflected in the overall 
incarceration program, the legislature would have to request a performance audit to 
see if these activities were actually curtailed.   
 
Legislative Preference for Small Programs 
 
The legislature is likely to prefer a more discrete program structure which 
allows them strategic control either in a policy or political sense.  At a policy level, 
Alternative 3 focuses on the Department’s subprograms which roll up in to the larger 
programs described in Alternative 2.  Legislative budgeting based on Alternative 3 
would allow the legislators to influence the intermediate or short term strategies used 
to achieve a lower recidivism rate.  For instance, it allows control over funding for 
substance abuse reduction programs, which relates to the intermediate outcome of 
reducing substance abuse among prisoners, which in turn relates to the longer term 
outcome of reducing recidivism.  These outcomes are also much more likely to be 
measurable in a budget cycle and thus lend themselves to “informal oversight” 
through the legislative budget process.  
From a political perspective, Alternatives 1, 3, or 4, allow the legislature to be 
much more targeted about the specific purposes associated with a fund cut or 
increase.  Legislators are often very concerned about facilities in their districts and a 
cut to a lump sum “incarceration program” could fall anywhere.  A cut to a private 
prison or detention center is likely to be a much more “controlled” cut, and to cut a 
specific prison (as might occur in Alternative 4) would be the most controlled of all.  
In a sense, a more discrete program structure allows the legislature to use programs to 
clarify legislative intent.  In Georgia, this may be a particular temptation since 
legislators are barred from making explicit policy changes in the appropriations bill 
and only express intent through their “tracking documents.”  It may also be a 
                                                          
20 Some of this played out in the FY07 debate over the Administrative Office of the Courts, where 
apparently, the legislature wanted to cut overhead, and the AOC threatened to cut judicial training.  
The legislature then moved funds for training to a separate training program.   
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temptation where the legislators do not trust the agencies or executive branches to 
adhere to legislative intent as expressed in the tracking documents.  
 
Accountability for Results 
 
 Technically, as the legislature appropriates to more and more specific 
programs, they should assume more and more accountability for results.  In 
Alternative 2, the Commissioner has flexibility to pick the strategies that would lead 
to good results for the prison system.  So for instance, the Commissioner gets to 
allocate funds to the mix of substance abuse treatment, education, counseling, 
chaplaincy, etc. that he or she believes will lead to the best possible outcomes 
(typically improved prison safety and reductions in recidivism).  In Alternative 3, 
however, the legislature would be allocating funds to the appropriate mix of strategies 
that they believed would lead to good outcomes, and in a sense, holding the agency 
accountable for intermediate and short term outcomes, while they take responsibility 
for the long term outcomes. 
 
Control Orientations: Ex-Ante Control versus Ex-Post Control 
 
 Having the legislature intervene heavily, as would be the case in Alternative 3 
or 4, is a legislative prerogative associated with the design of democratic government.  
These sorts of refined program structures are visible in states such as Pennsylvania.  
However, the legislature, particularly a part time one (Pennsylvania is a full time 
legislature), typically is not in a position to enforce effective day-to-day management 
of public funds.  Locking agencies into funding levels at a high level of detail 
emphasizes control over flexible management.  It might stop some poor management 
practices, limit agency choices, force the agencies to adopt legislative strategies, and 
prevent abuse, but it does not allow managers to adapt to changing circumstances, to 
implement policies effectively, or to innovate.  For instance, to shift money out of a 
strategy that may not be working may take an entire budget cycle.  The executive 
budget office might also adopt a control orientation with a similar effect although the 
time to transfer funds may be shorter. 
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In the public administration literature, flexibility and managerial discretion is 
associated with better and more innovative management practices (Wilson 1989; 
Rainey 1997) and is one of the fundamental tenets of performance based budgeting 
(Osborne and Gaebler 1992; Hatry 1999).  It is also, of course, associated with 
corruption, waste, and mismanagement.  The question is how to mediate between a 
control versus management orientation.   
 
Ex Ante Control 
 
Program and performance budgeting is intended to shift control legislative 
and to some degree executive control from “ex-ante” (or occurring prior to budget 
implementation) to “ex-post” (or occurring after budget implementation), with the 
idea that ex-post controls of audit and evaluation are more effective at mediating the 
control versus management dilemma than ex-ante controls.  Ex ante controls, 
however, which are associated with extensive agency reporting requirements, are 
cheaper to implement (or at least the systems are already in place for their 
implementation).  In the current budget framework, ex-ante control is represented by 
the transfer controls established by the legislature over programs and the transfer 
controls established by OPB over the object classes.  Although the program controls 
may be new, the systems for ex ante oversight are already in place.  
 
Ex Post Control 
 
Ex-post controls are associated with audit and evaluation and require new 
investments in government operations.  In an ex-post framework, managers have 
more discretion to move funds as needed, but will be held accountable through 
evaluation after implementation.  An ex post framework requires some up front 
thought: programs must be appropriately defined and the state must have systems for 
accurately tracking funds by program without having to rely on ex ante controls to 
attain accurate numbers.  Currently, agencies in Georgia indicate that they carefully 
track funds that are monitored by OPB, the legislature, and the auditor, but are less 
careful about funds that are not monitored.  Control based on evaluation becomes 
expensive because it requires investment in accuracy and it requires an on-going 
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investment in trained and trusted staff or contractors who can conduct appropriate 
evaluations.  
 
Program Development for Evaluation and Transparency 
 
Ex post controls rely on transparency and evaluation, which in turn require a 
program structure that is defined at a more discrete level and perhaps reported at a 
more discrete level, but is not necessarily heavily controlled (ex ante) at a more 
discrete level.  Looking at the evaluations of the Department of Corrections 
conducted by Florida’s Office of Program Policy Analysis and Governmental 
Accountability (OPPAGA), one of the more respected evaluation agencies in the 
country,21 one can see that the evaluations occur at many different levels of the 
department (see Table 5).  For instance OPPAGA evaluates the prison industries 
program, an “activity” in Georgia’s budget, a demonstration project intended to 
reduce prostitution, and use of the motor vehicle fleet, an object class.  In some 
earlier cases, not shown in the table, OPPAGA evaluated a specific prison or center.   
Although not all of these evaluations involve funding, one can imagine 
evaluations assessing efficiency and levels of funding along all of these different 
budgetary dimensions.  This suggests that a program structure appropriate to support 
evaluations may need to be flexible or one that can be sliced across different and at 
times overlapping dimensions.  Given existing transfer controls in Georgia’s budget, 
an evaluation-oriented program structure is likely to be too rigid to be appropriate for 
the current appropriations process.  
There are some benefits to reporting programs in the appropriations bill, 
however.  As noted earlier, reporting a program in an appropriations bill may 
improve the accuracy of reporting funding levels in each program.  If programs are 
not carefully tracked or activities are not tracked at all, then the costs of evaluation (at 
least in terms of associating evaluation with spending) will rise.  An evaluator is more 
likely  to  have  to  use cost allocation techniques to estimate the costs of the program.   
                                                          
21 See Government Performance Project (2005a) Note not all evaluations relate to the budget per 
se, but these evaluations could be used for purposes of giving legislators budgetary advice. 
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TABLE 5: OPPAGA EVALUATIONS FOR DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS 2003-2006 
 
 
 
 
OPPAGA Report 
 
 
 
 
Unit of Analysis 
Current Status in 
Georgia Budget 
Designation: Program, 
Sub-Program, Object 
Class, Activity 
Report No. 06-67 Progress Report: PRIDE Is 
Tightening Its Business Practices But Needs 
Greater Transparency (October 2006) 
Prison Industries Activity 
Report No. 06-37 Several Deficiencies Hinder 
the Supervision of Offenders in the Community 
Corrections Program (April 2006) 
Probation 
Supervision 
Program 
Report No. 06-15 Parole Commission 
Operations Consistent with Its Mission; 
Clemency Workload Needs to Be Addressed 
(February 2006) 
Parole Supervision 
Clemency  
Program  (State Board of 
Pardons and Paroles) 
Report No. 05-19 OPPAGA Report: Electronic 
Monitoring Should Be Better Targeted to the 
Most Dangerous Offenders (April 2005) 
Electronic 
Monitoring 
Activity (Department of 
Corrections) 
Sub-program (State Board 
of Pardons and Paroles) 
Report No. 04-69 Information Brief: 
Correctional Substance Abuse Programs, While 
Few, Are Reasonably Efficient and Effective 
(October 2004)  
Substance Abuse  Activity 
Report No. 04-61 Progress Report: Inmate 
Health Care Consolidation Progressing; 
Privatization Requires Agency Vigilance 
(August 2004) 
Health  Program 
Report No. 04-60 Progress Report: Corrections 
Program Still Challenged by Inmate Idleness, 
Prison Planning, and Fleet Maintenance 
(August 2004) 
State Prisons 
Motor Vehicles 
Program 
Object Class 
Report No. 04-59 Progress Report: Corrections 
Education and Rehabilitative Programs 
Significantly Reduced  (August 2004) 
Education Sub-program 
Report No. 04-58 Progress Report: More 
Efficient Use of Probation Officers and 
Prioritization of Victim Restitution Needed 
(August 2004) 
Probation Services  
Victim Services 
Program 
Sub-program 
Report No. 04-50 Project HOPE Helped Break 
the Cycle of Prostitution and Solicitation, But 
Had Implementation Problems (August 2004)  
HOPE Program  Not implemented in 
Georgia 
Report No. 03-68 Special Report: PRIDE 
Benefits the State But Needs to Improve 
Transparency in Operations (December 2003)  
  
Prison Industries Activity 
Source: OPPAGA Web Site: Office of Program Policy Analysis and Government Accountability. 
Reports by Topic Area. Criminal and Juvenile Justice: URL http://www. oppaga.state.fl.us/ 
reports/topic/crimetop.html [Accessed January 15, 2006]. 
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Also, if the program is found to be not effective, then it will be more difficult to 
reallocate the resources to more effective strategies or to adjust the resources to 
improve effectiveness.  
 
Informal Evaluation and Transparency 
 
Reporting programs in the appropriations bills allows a type of “eyeball” 
evaluation, where legislators and other external constituencies can place performance 
measures next to a revenue stream and assess progress towards an outcome.  This sort 
of visibility means that a program is not “out of sight out of mind” as was often the 
problem with the previous line item budgets.   
A program structure that provides a platform for evaluation and transparency 
requires a variety of elements: 
1) tracking at a high level of refinement. 
 
2) accuracy in tracking programs. 
 
3) visibility in documents available to the legislators and the public. 
 
Again, an evaluation oriented program structure does not necessarily require 
the types of transfer controls seen in Georgia’s budget.  The transfer controls become 
important only in so far as they ensure accuracy.  Further, it may be useful to report 
programs in the budget, but only because this is a publicly available document 
(unlike BudgetNet currently).  If the state wants to shift to an ex post control model—
as suggested by a program based performance oriented model and avoid the conflicts 
associated with ex ante control, then it may want to look for ways to improve 
accuracy and reporting without the burden of the transfer controls associated with 
reporting a program in the budget document. Also, as noted earlier, an ex post system 
requires capacity to evaluate.  A legislature may be hesitant to give up ex ante control 
over programs if it does not have ex post capacity to evaluate based on a trusted 
source of information.  
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IV. Technical Challenges in Implementing a Program Structure  
 
All of the previous policy, control, and evaluation criteria also have to be 
reconciled with technical challenges associated with defining programs.  In fact, 
when Georgia’s agencies designed their program structure, most were more 
concerned about these technical problems than performance measures or strategic 
planning.  These problems are fundamentally related to synchronizing the program 
structure with existing accounting structures and organizational arrangements.  Most 
agencies attempted to avoid creating “new programs,” or in other words, they tried to 
create programs that rested on existing accounting categories.  In almost all cases 
where agencies created “new programs,” it was at the behest of the legislature.  The 
fundamental technical challenge in developing programs is figuring out how much an 
agency actually spends on a particular public purpose.  Where the legislature requires 
the program to account for revenues— a further technical challenge becomes tracking 
the revenues by program.  
 
Accounting Problems: The Structure of Expenditure and Revenue Allocation 
Prior to program budgeting, most agencies “accounted for” expenditures 
based on object class, cost center (organizational unit), and typically some mix of 
functional classifications which varied widely.  For the Department of Corrections, 
functional classifications included administration, health, counseling, inmate 
education, etc.  For agencies such as the Department of Human Resources, functional 
classifications included “mini-programs”—such as suicide prevention, tobacco use 
reduction, and restaurant inspections.  Agencies such as DHR and DCH also had to 
mesh the state accounting structure with federal funding requirements (such as 
Medicaid classifications which provided the structure for the federal Medicaid 
reimbursement rates).   
In constructing programs, it is helpful to visualize the process within the 
organization through which expenditures are classified.  In large state agencies, there 
may be administrators throughout the agency accounting for expenditures.  For every 
expenditure item, administrators have to assign an account code which determines 
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how the expenditure will be classified—by object class, by organization, by function, 
by fund source, at times by revenue source, and now by program.   
These classifications can be thought of as a multidimensional matrix.  As an 
example, prior to the advent of program budgeting, the Department of Corrections 
had expenditure categories by object class, cost center (typically a facility), and by 
functional codes.  A very simplified version of a matrix for a single state prison might 
look as follows: 
 
TABLE 6:  MATRIX OF EXPENDITURE ACCOUNTS FOR A STATE PRISON 
 ------------------------------------------------------Functional Class----------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
Object Class 
 
 
 
Admin. 
 
 
 
Chaplaincy 
 
 
 
Counseling 
 
 
 
Education 
 
 
Food 
Service 
 
 
 
Library 
Plant 
Operations 
and 
Maintenance 
 
 
 
Security 
Personal Services $        
Regular Operating 
Expenses 
        
Travel         
Motor Vehicle 
Purchases 
        
Equipment         
Computer Charges         
Real Estate 
Rentals 
        
Telecomm.         
Per Diem and Fees         
Capital Outlay         
Contracts         
Utilities         
 
This is a “simple” matrix because in reality there are hundreds of codes and 
sub-codes for object classes.  Administrators at each state prison (or each facility) 
keep track of how much money they have as well as how money is being spent using 
the same matrix.  At any point in time budget officers in the main office should be 
able to pull up all the funds that are classified under the common object class codes, 
the functional codes, or by organization.  The matrix will also have another 
dimension that includes revenues with a particular emphasis on restricted revenues 
such as federal funds that go to support operations. 
 Most agencies’ program structures aligned program designations with 
combinations of existing functional or organizational accounting classifications in 
order to keep the accounting process simple.  In a system that follows existing 
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classifications, lower level administrators do not have to make choices about 
programs, they have a single program code because the “program designation” is a 
roll up of multiple cost centers or functional categories.   
As shown in Table 7, the Department of Corrections provides an example of 
an organizational “roll up.”  In creating programs, the Department mostly was guided 
by facility or cost centers.  So for instance, administrators responsible for expenses 
within a state prison only have to add one program code – they are not dividing their 
activities between multiple programs.  They can continue on more or less as 
previously and for the most part their program code is simply associated with their 
overall organizational codes (or “cost center”) since all of the prisons and the 
associated prison expenditures roll up into the state prisons program.  Incidentally, 
the subprograms (see Figure 3) are the previous functional codes with which 
administrators are already familiar.  The Department of Corrections, presumably with 
the same ease, could have created “programs” based on these functional 
classifications as well.   
 
TABLE 7:  DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS PROGRAM STRUCTURE 
State Prisons Based on facilities 
Probation Supervision Based on probation offices which are organized by judicial circuits 
Offender Management Several cost centers are rolled up into this program, including offender 
classification, special operations, and county camps 
Jail Subsidy Previously an object class; broken out by the legislature from the offender 
management program 
Private Prisons Based on contracts for facilities  
Transition Centers Based on facilities 
Probation Detention 
Centers 
Based on facilities 
Parole Revocation Centers Based on facilities 
Probation Diversion 
Centers 
Based on facilities 
Bainbridge PSATC Based on facilities 
Health Technically a functional code, but state has several discreet contracts with 
private organizations to provide health care, mental health care and dental 
care to the prison system  
Food and Farm Operations Technically a functional code and the one program where operations cut 
across organizational boundaries.  This program captures central 
administration and the costs of purchasing food produced at different 
prisons. 
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Most agencies built their initial programs on existing functional or 
organizational codes.  Keeping the underlying structure the same has the following 
advantages: 
1) Agencies avoid having to work through new cost allocation systems. 
 
2) The agency will be able to generate historical information on 
expenditures by a variety of public purposes. 
 
3) Staff throughout the organization do not have to be significantly 
retrained. 
 
4) Less potential for error or “gaming the system” by misclassification of 
expenditures. 
 
The Dilemmas of Creating New Programs 
 
Consider for instance if a policymaker asked the Department of Corrections 
to create a boot camp “program.”  Some state prisons run a “boot camp” program that 
is integrated into their daily operations and there might be good policy reasons to 
understand whether or not this program is a cost effective strategy for managing the 
prison population.  However, if told to create a boot camp program, the Department 
would have to make a number of changes: 
 
1) Cost Allocation:  The agency will have to come up with methods to assign 
expenditures and revenues to the new program.  In effect, some decision rule 
would have to be adopted to break out all of the various boxes in Table 7 
between the old state prisons program and the new boot camp program.  
There are a variety of techniques for assigning costs some involve breaking 
up each object class by program use or random moments surveys.  Typically, 
however, agencies will use rough estimates; for instance, an agency might 
assign staff and all the associated costs of that staff member to a particular 
program.  Even these rough estimates, however, can be complicated.  
Agencies prefer to develop a cost center when a new program is created and 
funded through law rather than to go back and have to break out costs after 
the fact.   
 
Cost Allocation Assumptions:  One danger in cost allocation is making 
assumptions that bias funding levels towards one program or another.  For 
instance, in talking with agencies, several assigned office space to only one 
program (usually the program that uses the most office space), even though a 
space may house several programs.  Although such decision-rules are much 
easier to administer than actually splitting the cost for the space among 
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several programs, consistently assigning these expenditures to one program 
rather than another (for instance the “administration program”) can inflate the 
overall budget for that program, and in general, means that the state still does 
not truly know how much is being spent on a particular public service.  
 
Cost Allocation and Federal Funds:  Some federal grants require the state 
agencies to develop cost allocation plans to ensure appropriate charges for 
overhead and agency services.  As new programs are added or there are 
changes in cost allocation for state funds, this may trigger a need to 
recalculate cost allocation plans at the federal level as well.  For instance, if a 
program is added to an agency and the federal government stipulates that it 
will only pay its proportionate fair share of overhead, then that new state 
program will have to be charged a percentage of agency overhead and the 
federally reimbursed percentage of overhead will decrease.  
 
2) Lack of Historical Data:  The larger and more complex these estimates and 
assumptions are, the more likely the agency is to misestimate the costs when 
making budget requests because they do not have historical information about 
how the money was expended.  
 
3) Training and Changing Organizational Practices: Staff in the organization 
would have to be trained about which expenditures should be billed to the 
boot camp program.  Such a classification might require changes in 
organizational practices.  For instance, security personnel may need to keep 
time sheets to show which fraction of their time (and thus salary) should be 
allocated to the boot camp program and which to general security services in 
the state prison.  These changes in accounting and organizational practice 
would have to cut across every state prison that had the program.  
 
4) Misclassification:  One of the dangers of program budgeting that may become 
especially acute when new programs cut across historical accounting 
categories is that staff at different levels of the organization begin to 
accidentally or purposefully “game the system.”  Imagine that the Department 
of Corrections created the boot camp program but overestimated the costs 
perhaps by assigning too much for regular operating expenses to the boot 
camp program.  If an administrator at the facility found that there was a 
surplus in the boot camp program but a deficit in the prison as a whole, it 
would not be hard to reason that the activities of the two programs are closely 
intertwined, and thus, to start paying for more expenditures such out of the 
boot camp program.   
 
Misallocation of funds to programs are likely to be a problem if the agency 
has 1) new programs and no historical precedent of how to allocate costs to the new 
program; 2) agency staff were previously careless about assigning costs to the cost 
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center or functional classes upon which their current programs are based; or 3) 
program expenditures or revenues are consistently difficult to predict.   
The first two are technical problems that can be worked out over time, but in 
the interim it can be very time consuming for agencies and put them at risk for audit 
exceptions (when auditors’ find that funds were improperly accounted for) or for 
violations of state law.  The third problem is “systemic” and suggests that the 
program definitions themselves need to be restructured to accommodate the practical 
realities of a particular public service. 
Although the example above is hypothetical, there are real problems 
experienced by agencies as they attempt to sort through their program structures.  
Examples include:   
● The Department of Transportation: Previous accounting categories were by 
project, function, and object class.  Now staff serving similar functions, such 
as planning and design, are split between programs such as Local Road 
Assistance Program and State Highway Construction and Improvement.  The 
Department has solved the cost accounting problem by fully allocating staff 
to one program or the other (even though on occasion, a local planner will do 
state work and vice versa).  Office space is tied to the FTEs.  IT is in 
administration and so forth.   
 
● The Department of Community Health:  Previous accounting categories 
allowed Medicaid payments to be rolled up under a single object class and 
functional class category.  This large lump sum was divided into activities in 
the agency accounting systems based on services provided and in alignment 
with federal expense classifications for reimbursement.  With program 
budgeting, the legislature split the Medicaid program into two programs—
Medicaid Aged, Blind, and Disabled (ABD) and Low Income Medicaid 
(LIM) programs.  Now every service provided must also be allocated to one 
of the two Medicaid programs depending on the type of client served.  What 
this requires is a change in coding for services.  Some services such as 
nursing home care can generally be coded under the ABD program; other 
services such as physician primary care has to be divided based on the client.  
The agency does not have historical information related to how these funds 
were previously classified.  
 
● The State Board of Pardons and Paroles: Previous accounting categories 
were by object class and cost center.  Field offices must now account for staff 
and related expenses that are in the Clemency program versus the Parole 
Supervision Program (as well as a variety of subprograms).  Similar to the 
Department of Transportation, this also requires cost allocation rules to 
account for office space, equipment, etc.   
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Clarity of Program Definitions 
 
A closely related issue is the clarity of program definitions.  Previously, with 
the use of object classes, agencies, the State Auditor, OPB, and the legislature could 
be very consistent across agencies about how to classify expenditures.  With 
programs, every agency is now different.  If the agency is using “roll ups” of previous 
classifications, there is more likely to be a precedent and common set of 
understandings throughout the agency of how to determine what goes into which 
program.  However, again with new programs, there will be issues of classifying 
expenditures to programs.  The more disaggregated the program structure and the less 
institutional history there is, the more complex the problem.   
Major issues with respect to the program definition include: 
 
● Clarification of cost accounting procedures between programs where 
necessary. 
 
● Clarification through agreement and discussion with agencies about which 
expenditures are appropriately classified in a particular program. 
 
Defining Administration  
 
One area where program definitions are a problem across agencies is in the 
definition of administration.  Agency staff identified a number of considerations in 
the definition of administration—some of which may be cause for considerable 
concern among policymakers. 
 
● Some agencies indicate that they use administration program funds to give 
themselves flexibility across programs.  Since there is no clear definition of 
administration, many kinds of expenditures can be technically classified as 
“administrative.” This tactic is being used to shore up program shortfalls.  
 
● Some agencies indicate that because legislators like to “cut” administrative 
funds, they are making a concentrated effort to cost allocate all funds possible 
to programs.  
 
● Other agencies, in the name of being “transparent,” are allocating all 
programmatic administrative functions to the administration program.  
 
In the original budget instructions, administration is not considered to be a 
program.  According to the state’s strategic planning instructions: “activities that are 
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solely management or administrative (e.g., budgeting, human resource management, 
and data management) are not directly related to changes in the agency's customers 
and, thus, are not considered programs.” (Governor’s Office of Planning and Budget, 
Georgia Merit System, and Georgia Technology Authority [2004], p.16)   
Technically, best practices in cost accounting require all funds to be distributed to a 
program since administration is just “overhead.” (Michel 2004)  At a minimum, 
consistency in allocating as many direct costs as possible to a program is important 
if programs are intended to accurately reflect actual costs of providing a particular 
public service.   
 
Organizational/Structural Considerations 
 
Programs not only create management dilemmas if they cut across accounting 
lines but they can also create dilemmas as they cut across organizational lines.  At the 
most basic level, new programs within an organization can require administrative 
staff to be trained in new ways to account for expenditures.  However, there are also 
more serious dilemmas associated with program budgeting and the way the program 
structure interacts with organizational considerations.  Some selected examples 
follow: 
 
● The Department of Human Resources, Division of Public Health:  Prior to 
program budgeting, the Division of Public Health (DPH) allocated around 
$65 million to local public health offices and to public health districts based 
on a formula.  This “grant-in-aid” program was used for a variety of public 
health activities—for instance, epidemiology, refugee health, and cancer 
screening, etc. The agency gave localities significant flexibility to use the 
funds for purposes as needed and further to account for the funds using their 
own system.  At the end of the year, the agency conducted a random moment 
survey (RMS) and used this to account for how funds were spent.   
 
Program budgeting caused the local grant-in-aid formula funds to be split 
across nine of the twelve DPH programs, but the administration of grant-in-
aid funds has not shifted to reflect the change in philosophy.  In effect, the 
Department of Public Health pulls funds out of the nine programs based on 
the previous year’s expenditures and allocates them to localities as through 
the grant-in-aid formula.  The local offices proceed to spend the money 
without reference to the program designations.  At the end of the year, using 
the random moments survey, the agency then re-spreads the funds across the 
programs based on how the local entities actually spent the funds.   
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This method requires the agency to return to Fiscal Affairs prior to the end of 
the fiscal year to ensure that the budgeted amounts for each program align 
with actual expenditures.  This sort of organization means that program 
allocations do not drive state priorities; rather the local entities choose the 
priorities and then the funds are retrofit back into the program categories.  On 
the one hand, the state does account for how much was spent on selected 
public priorities as described by the programs.  On the other, the actual 
allocations to the programs does not necessarily correspond with the priorities 
that are funded.  Table 8 shows the anticipated spread of the local grant in aid 
(GIA) funds through the public health budget. 
 
 
TABLE 8:  DISTRIBUTION OF LOCAL GRANT IN AID (GIA) “FORMULA” GRANT IN 
PROGRAMS 
New Program Total Budget Local GIA
Adolescent & Adult Health Promotion $48,538,817 $12,967,693
Adult Essential Health Services  $14,627,430 $6,734,563
Emergency Preparedness & Response  $6,989,265 $1,866,932
Epidemiology $5,538,665 $1,004,518
Immunization $17,982,978 $7,660,179
Infant & Child Essential Health Services $44,873,323 $8,374,928
Infant & Child Health Promotion $108,203,999 $7,212,223
Infectious Disease Control $46,185,547 $8,011,465
Injury Prevention & Control $539,398 $0
Inspections & Environmental Hazard Control $14,955,915 $11,900,473
Vital Records $2,496,867 $0
Public Health Administration $18,782,210 $0
Total Base Budget $329,714,414 $65,732,974
 
 
Were the localities to actually be restricted by the program designations as 
they currently stand, there might be a problem of having programs (and 
particularly subprograms) with amounts too small to be of use to localities, 
and further, these splits would likely create serious problems of cost 
allocation at the local level.  These sorts of program restrictions would also 
mean that localities could no longer allocate funds to meet local needs.  For 
instance, public health offices in rural areas need to spend money on 
immunizations, while those in urban areas will find that most of the 
immunizations are administered through private providers.   
 
Although a program structure can be designed to overcome these dilemmas, 
the program structure as it currently stands does not mesh well with the 
devolution of funds to the local level.   
 
● Department of Juvenile Justice:  Another dilemma raised by the Department 
of Juvenile Justice as well as several other agencies (in different contexts, 
such as the need to mask over-inflated federal funds appropriated to a 
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program) is the need for the central office to hold money in reserve in order to 
make up for overspending by field offices or other cost centers.   
 
If an agency chooses to devolve programmatic control to the local level, then 
they need to think carefully about how to manage agency-wide financing.  
Program managers at lower levels of an organization may have an incentive 
to spend all their money and force liabilities to the larger agency level.   
 
DJJ along with several other agencies as well as OPB noted that for 
management purposes, object classes are useful in identifying where 
shortfalls are occurring and to generally diagnose input problems throughout 
the agency.  
 
● Fragmentation and Pockets of Funding:  Until agencies become more adept 
at predicting amounts required in programs, programs can have the effect of 
creating “pockets” of funding that cannot be spent.  A more serious problem 
associated with having many programs is fracturing funding streams as the 
funds are “devolved” down through the organizational structure, such as 
regional or local offices.  For instance, if transfer controls were put on the 
Department of Corrections subprograms (which are equivalent to its 
functional categories such as counseling, chaplaincy, education, etc.), then the 
agency would not only be constrained by the existing organizational 
arrangements but would be constrained by very small amounts of money 
allocated across many of the activities internal to each prison (see Tables 3 
and 4).   
 
Similar fragmenting might happen with the Division of Public Health, which 
sends money to the local and regional public health offices, if it were to 
actually constrain the local offices by the program categories (see Table 8) 
rather than “retrofitting” local assistance grants to programmatic categories as 
described above.  
 
Volatility in Population and Revenues 
The following section lists concerns raised by agencies about the difficulties 
predicting the need for expenditures within a particular program category.  Over time, 
most of these estimates should become more stable and more predictable; however, 
during the initial creation of programs agencies may have to guess.  Most states tend 
to underestimate federal funds as a way of being conservative about revenues 
available to the state; however, as shown earlier, the magnitude of these 
underestimates vary across states.   
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Considerations include: 
1) Difficulty in accurately projecting service demand or in projecting federal or 
other revenues anticipated to cover program expenditures. 
 
2) Requirements for immediate payment may lead to agency problems of 
overspending in a particular program and then retroactively requesting 
program shifts to reflect actual expenditures  (and the uncertainty that comes 
from submitting this to a political process after the decision has actually been 
made). 
 
These considerations are affected by: 
● Frequency of Crisis:  An issue raised in conjunction with the Public Health 
Division budget is the need to reallocate funds in response to a public health 
crisis.  The division noted that something as simple as discovering a person 
with active tuberculosis can cause all public health resources in a jurisdiction 
to be diverted to identifying and notifying people who have come into contact 
with that person.  Similarly, major crises such as Hurricane Katrina caused a 
diversion of funds into emergency health services, crossing program 
categories.   
 
● Shifts in Service Demand: Some agencies such as the Department of 
Corrections, Department of Community Health and Department of Human 
Resources expressed concern about the difficulty of projecting “population 
demand” for particular services.  The Department of Corrections is influenced 
by the crime rate, the propensity of judges to make different kinds of 
sentences, and legislation influencing placement of offenders.  Program 
budgeting requires more accurate projections about how trends and legislation 
will influence not just overall agency budgets but the very specific programs 
affected.  
 
Similarly, mental health programs with the Department of Human Resources 
are influenced by federal legal requirements for the state to transition from 
mental health hospitals to community based care – each of which are separate 
programs.  Accurately projecting how this transition will affect each 
program’s budget can be complex.  First, the agency may need to project how 
rapidly patients will transition from one program to the next.  Second, they 
have to predict how this will affect costs.  These transitions cannot simply be 
calculated on a “cost per patient” basis.  For instance, hospitals tend to have 
high fixed costs (for instance, all the costs of keeping the infrastructure 
running), which of course do not vary on a per patient basis.  
 
● Federal Reimbursements: Population demand may also interact with federal 
regulations.  The Department of Human Resources and Department of 
Community Health use state Medicaid funds to meet initial service demands.  
Although these funds are matched at the federal level, these agencies are not 
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immediately reimbursed by the federal government which means that they 
may have to shift state funds across program categories to pay for services 
and then reimburse back into programs through federal funds.  Thus, not only 
may population demand vary from year to year and thus influence demand for 
particular programmatic services, but also keeping track of the “loans” made 
across programs creates a level of complexity that did not exist prior to 
program budgeting.  
 
Complications with Federal or “Other” Funds 
 
 Although not mentioned by agencies as a specific problem to date (and 
certainly something that they are unlikely to reveal), complications can occur with 
federal funds which need to be considered when designating a program structure—
particular if policymakers external to the agency want a hand in the allocation of 
federal funds.  Specifically, federal funds come with legal restrictions such as 
“supplement not supplant” requirements or they may be associated with certain fund 
maximization efforts (such as Medicaid programs).  Programs have to align with 
federal funds so that the agencies do not end up in violation of federal requirements—
for instance, if state general funds are removed from a program and federal funds are 
used instead of state funds, the agency may end up appearing to “supplant” state 
funds with federal funds within a program.   
Another major concern could be if federal funding streams cut across 
program categories and create another tier of problems with the classification of 
funds.  Some agencies end up keeping one set of books for the federal government 
and another for the state.   
Finally, federal programs may have requirements about the distribution of 
overhead for federal reimbursement purposes.  Although it does not initially appear to 
be a major complication for agencies, agencies often have to allocate overhead based 
on their federal agreements and there could be potential complications when they 
have to “back out” these federal funds into their state “administration” program. 
 
Making a Program Out of a Fund Source 
 
 Several staff interviewed expressed concern that fund sources, such as 
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, the Solid Waste Trust Fund, and the 
Hazardous Waste Trust Fund are not programs but fund sources.  The legislative staff 
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made these into programs with the argument that this would enforce more 
accountability in how the funds are spent.   
 
Technical Problems and the Agency Preference for Large Programs 
 
Agencies prefer large programs, and associated flexibility, for management 
purposes and strategic purposes.  However, agencies also prefer flexibility and larger 
programs because it helps them avoid many of these technical and organizational 
challenges.  Larger programs mean that agencies face less complexity in assigning 
expenditures and revenues to programs or in transferring funds between different 
public purposes or activities.  They do not have to conduct complex cost allocation 
procedures, or worry about different levels of the organization misallocating 
expenditures.  They are less likely to face audit risks, and they have more ability to 
adapt to changing circumstances and emergencies.  This agency preference for large 
programs is related to concerns over complexity, flexibility, and (likely) transparency 
each of which can be addressed with different structures:   
 
● Complexity:  Agencies prefer large programs in part because they reduce the 
complexity of accounting and budgeting and reduce the potential for audit 
risk in appropriately assigning expenditures and revenues to the correct 
programs.  Although agencies can adjust to some of these problems over 
time, complexity itself can only be solved through larger programs and a 
program structure that is not highly refined.   
 
● Flexibility:  Some of this preference for large programs is really about the 
flexibility to move funds to respond to changing circumstances.  Addressing 
these issues can be solved through reducing transfer controls or the various 
requirements that the agency solicit approval from OPB or the legislature 
prior to moving money.  In theory, agencies could have a highly refined 
program structure, with significant flexibility—in keeping with an ex post 
control scenario.  Complexity would still be a concern. 
 
● Transparency:  Agencies may be reluctant to reveal their internal operations 
and decision-making.  For instance, some agencies express concern that if 
they shift funds between programs, it will be interpreted by the Governor or 
legislature as “excess funds.” Addressing this concern can be solved through 
large programs that mask internal operations; however, this approach can also 
undermine accountability.  Rather than creating lump sum programs, a better 
solution would be increased legislative and executive branch sensitivity to the 
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problems of management and the need to adapt to changing circumstances or 
to simply correct mistakes that occur in any large organization.   
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V. Considerations in Building a Program Structure 
 In summary, considerations in program designation are: 
1) The association of a discrete set of activities with a discrete product, service, 
or outcome. 
 
2) Balancing between legislative and executive control and managerial 
flexibility (associated with who should be held accountable for making the 
strategic choices that lead to a particular outcome and what level of outcomes 
the executive and legislature want to associate with funding). 
 
3) Providing a platform for evaluation and transparency for public purposes – in 
particular the association of funding with outcomes.  
 
4) Avoiding technical, managerial, and organizational costs. 
 
Part of the dilemma of program budgeting in Georgia rests on competing 
pressures for a highly aggregated program structure versus a highly disaggregated 
program structure, and part of the dilemma rests on the interaction of a “program” 
designation in the appropriations bill with the legal restrictions on the transfer of 
funds.  Key elements of this control framework in its current form in Georgia include: 
 
● A 2 percent restriction on transfer of funds from object class to program 
designation and the addition of a $250,000 restriction on transfer of funds (in 
FY06 and FY07, the restriction is 2 percent or $250,000, whichever is less 
except for Medicaid). 
 
● Inter-program transfers require approval from both OPB and the Fiscal 
Affairs Committee.  Although OPB is available year round, Fiscal Affairs 
only meets occasionally (typically once or twice a year).   
 
● Agencies are audited not to the object class accounts but to the programs.  
Being significantly off in program designations can cause an “audit 
exception.”  
 
● Although the transition to program budgeting has removed some of the legal 
requirements associated with object classes, OPB continues to monitor and (at 
least informally) approve transfers of funds between object class and/or 
program or subprogram classification.   
 
These controls create “friction” for agencies when they try to move funds 
between programs and are the basis for the legal worries about appropriately 
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allocating expenditures and revenues to the correct program.  The more disaggregated 
the program structure, the more problematic this friction becomes.  However, the 
more disaggregated the program structure, the more control the legislature has over 
various strategic policy decisions about how to achieve certain outcomes and the 
more useful the program definitions become for evaluation purposes and for 
providing a clear picture of agency priorities and operations to those external to the 
agency or executive branch (transparency).  There are several ways that the state 
might want to consider adjusting its program structure and related controls to better 
mediate between these competing tensions. 
  
Analysis and Considerations 
Building a Versatile Program Structure  
First, it is helpful to separate considerations of reporting, transparency, and 
evaluation from considerations about control.  In theory, a number of types of 
activities, programs and subprograms can be tracked, reported, evaluated and made 
more transparent without having to control at a highly specific level.  It should also 
be possible to track funds to accommodate a variety of legislative concerns including 
tracking funds by population, region, county, etc.  Such a program structure would 
lay a foundation for evaluation of a variety of activities and if reported in places that 
were readily visible to the legislature and public, would improve transparency.   
The most important item would be to build a system that is supple and where 
everyone can agree over the long term on a set of expenditure (and revenue) tracking 
categories that will be important over time and that can be coherently meshed with 
the agency organization and managerial capacity.  Setting such a foundation would 
also hopefully avoid future problems with the creation of new programs that cut 
across existing accounting structures, although agencies may still have problems with 
complexity and the legislature might still have problems trusting accuracy if transfer 
controls are not attached.    
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Adjusting Transfer Controls 
Second, given this accounting structure, policymakers can set up a hierarchy 
of control.  Table 9 represents the structure of control as it currently stands—
however, any box in this matrix can be manipulated through changing the legal 
requirements, executive directives, or dialogue with the agencies.  For instance:  
● Policymakers may want high agency flexibility but also high transparency—
then it is simply a matter of systematically reporting expenditures on key 
“activities,” “programs” or “subprograms,” but not locking the agencies down 
into expenditure categories (or giving higher levels of flexibility) or requiring 
regular reporting of fund transfers.   
 
● The 2 percent or $250,000 transfer control could obviously be adjusted across 
a number of dimensions—attaching 2 percent where the legislature wants 
significant control and allowing 5 percent or more where there is a need or 
desire for more flexibility.   
 
● If the legislature or executive choose to designate a program in the budget bill 
where the agency indicates that there will be problems with cost allocation, 
difficulty in predicting expenditure levels, or volatility in revenue/population 
then the legislature and executive might 1) allow a period of phase in to 
watch the expenditures to see if there are trends prior to designating the 
program in the budget bill or 2) designate the program but give the agency 
more flexibility in moving funds between selected program categories.   
 
Adjusting Processes Governing Transfers 
● Right now OPB tracks both object class, program and subprogram and 
requires notification prior to any change across these categories—this system 
could be altered to streamline approval requirements, allowing notification 
rather than approval in some cases or adjusting the time periods for 
notification. 
 
● The legislature could adjust the rules for the Fiscal Affairs Committee, 
meeting more often or delegating authority to staff to approve certain 
transfers.  Alternatively, OPB could notify the legislature of transfers and 
then the legislature would have a certain number of days to object—otherwise 
the transfer would be considered approved. 
 
Shifting to Ex Post Control 
Another option is to shift more heavily to a system of evaluation and ex post 
legislative oversight and control.  In Virginia’s recent reform, the legislature budgets 
to  programs  at  a  high level, but reports a fairly disaggregated set of subprograms in  
TABLE 9: CONSIDERATIONS IN PROGRAM DESIGNATION 
 
 
Levels of Program 
Definition 
 
 
 
Transparency 
 
Management 
Discretion/ 
Flexibility 
 
Accuracy 
(related to cost 
of Evaluation) 
 
Legal or 
Audit 
Liability 
Control 
over 
Strategy/ 
Priorities  
 
 
 
Considerations 
Non-Tracked Activities 
(Program-like activities that 
are not tracked in the 
accounting system) 
Low High Low – no 
account codes; 
funds are not 
tracked to the 
purpose; 
requires 
estimate to 
determine costs 
Low Agency  • Expenditures that are not likely to be subject to evaluation 
• Agreement that this is entirely a strategy under the control of 
agency management  
• Authorization language provides sufficient control; efficiency not a 
major consideration 
• Cost allocation problems too high to make tracking worthwhile 
• Desire to reduce complexity of accounting system 
Tracked Activities 
(Program-like activities not 
reported systematically but 
tracked in the accounting 
structure; these may also 
include “functional areas” 
such as support services) 
Agencies report expenditures 
(may also include revenues) 
for “activities” upon request 
 
Low – 
contingent on 
request 
High Moderate  – 
not audited but 
tracked internal 
to agency 
Low Agency • Expenditures for public purposes that are small (relative to overall 
budget) 
• Activities of only intermittent political interest 
• High levels of executive and legislative confidence in agency 
responsiveness to or congruence with executive or legislative intent  
• Authorization language provides control but may want capacity for 
intermittent evaluations of efficiency  
 
Sub-Programs  (Reported 
but unrestricted Programs) 
Subprograms are not 
formally designated in the 
appropriations bill, but are 
reported in BudgetNet.  OPB 
reviews all transfers between 
subprograms. 
Moderate – 
currently 
requires 
access to 
BudgetNet 
Moderate – Moderate – 
tracked by 
OPB and 
agency but not 
audited 
amounts 
Low Agency/ 
Governor -
OPB can 
deny 
approval to 
move funds 
• Activities that might ideally be an appropriated program but there is 
significant difficulty with  
o cost allocation or  
o volatility in revenue availability or volatility in population 
demand (and thus agencies need to move funds rapidly) 
• Expenditures for public purposes that make up component parts of 
program  
• High level of legislative confidence in executive/agency 
responsiveness to or congruence with legislative intent 
Appropriated Programs  
Expenditures pools are 
locked into 2% limit (or 
$250,000 ceiling); audit is at 
the program level. Moving 
funds requires both OPB and 
Fiscal Affairs approval. 
High – 
reported in 
Governor’s 
report and 
appropriations 
bill  
Low  High – tracked 
by OPB, 
agency and 
legislature, 
audited to 
program   
High – 
particularly 
with new 
programs  
and/or  
when high 
level cost 
allocation 
required 
Governor/ 
Legislature 
• Major areas of public purpose 
• Areas where there is a need for increased monitoring or 
accountability for expenditures associated with a particular public 
purpose 
• Areas where demand for high level of accuracy in expenditure 
classifications 
• Legislative or executive desire to communicate clear priorities and 
to control agency strategies for attaining long term outcomes   
• Lack of legislative/executive confidence in agency responsiveness 
to or congruence with legislative/executive intent 
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its appropriations bill (in keeping with ideas about transparency and units of 
evaluation).  For instance the Department of Corrections has four programs for 
appropriations purposes:  Supervision of Offenders and Re-Entry Services, Operation 
of State Residential Community Correctional Facilities, Operation of Secure 
Correctional Facilities, and Administrative and Support Services.  For informational 
purposes, however, the appropriations bill reports a total of 27 subprograms.   
The Auditor of Public Accounts reviews levels of spending in the different 
programs or service areas every couple years (presumably improving accuracy), and 
the Virginia legislature has one of the most respected evaluation and performance 
audit agencies in the country, the Joint Legislative Audit and Review Commission 
(Government Performance Project 2005b).  The legislature relies on this agency to 
evaluate executive transfers to ensure compliance with legislative intent as well as to 
assess overall agency performance and operations (creating the initial conditions for 
ex post control).  The legislature also has significant flexibility to make specific 
requests of agencies within the appropriations bill, something that the Georgia 
legislature may not be able to do.   
The executive Department of Planning and Budget (DPB) currently is given 
significant flexibility to move funds as long as it is in keeping with legislative intent.  
Transfers of over 10 percent between categories are generally thought to trigger 
legislative concerns.  DPB provides significant oversight of agency transfers between 
programs, subprograms, fund sources, years, agencies, etc. to insure that the agencies 
are not overspending and are complying with legislative intent.  They do very little 
oversight of object class transfers although agencies track these. 
Although this report does not presume to assess how effective Virginia’s 
system is in its application, the state does consistently receive grades of “A” from the 
Government Performance Project for its financial management and performance 
management systems.  Further, on the surface at least, the systems appear to be useful 
in mediating executive-legislative tension and providing a system of oversight and 
control that is compatible with managerial flexibility and discretion. 
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Appendix 
 
Virginia 
 
1) Does this state budget at the program level?  At what level do they appropriate 
funds?  
 
In the FY2007-08 biannual budget, the state budgeted at the program level, 
but reported funding levels for “service areas” in the appropriations bill as well.  For 
instance, the Department of Corrections has five principle programs: Supervision of 
Offenders and Re-entry Services, Financial Assistance for Confinement of Inmates in 
Local and Regional Facilities, Operation of State Residential Community 
Correctional Facilities, Operation of Secure Correctional Facilities, and 
Administrative and Support Services.  Under the program Operation of Secure 
Correctional Facilities, there are “service areas,” Virginia’s term for “subprograms” 
such as Supervision and Management of Inmates, Rehabilitation and Treatment 
Services, Prison Management, Food Services, Agribusiness, Medical and Clinical 
Services, Correctional Enterprises, and Physical Plant Services.  
 
These areas are further divided by object class, but object classes are only 
tracked and reported by the agencies, they are not reported in the appropriations bill.  
Legislative staff also report that they collect data about other budgetary 
breakdowns—such as the budget “per prison” or data on object class expenditures.  
These numbers are submitted to the legislature at the end of the fiscal year and by 
request.  
 
2) How does the state define “what is a program?” 
 
Virginia has “service areas” which are similar to subprograms in Georgia, 
these are defined as “areas of expenditure that support one or more products or 
services.” (Virginia Department of Planning and Budget 2005).  These “roll up” into 
programs, which are products (“items produced by the agency”) or services (“an 
action that the agency takes to fulfill its mission”) (Virginia Department of Planning 
and Budget 2005a).22 
 
                                                          
22 In another area, the State gives more detailed definitions.  A product is “an item an agency 
produces (i.e., the tangible output of a process) to meet the needs or demands of its customers and 
to fulfill its mission.”  A service is a distinct endeavor than an agency undertakes to meet the 
needs or demands of its customers and fulfill its mission.  A service can result form action taken 
by a single service area or multiple service areas.  The service can impact individuals, groups of 
individuals, organizations, or organizational units both internal and external.  An examination of 
an internal service may be the information-technology support to the business units of the 
organization.  An example of an external service may be a service supplied to a citizen or another 
part of government such as state or local agencies that receive financial support.”  A service area is 
an “area of expenditure that supports one or more products or services.  A service area can cut 
across more than one organizational unit.”  (Virginia Department of Planning and Budget 2005, 
pp. 44-45) 
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3) What was the process that the State used to determine program structure?  In 
particular, how did the state coordinate between the agencies, executive budget office 
and legislative budget staff? 
 
The state has had a program structure dating back to 1980.  In 1995-96, the 
state implemented a strategic planning and performance management system.  In July 
of 2003, the legislature passed the “Roadmap for Virginia’s Future,” which 
authorized the Governor’s Council for Virginia’s Future to overhaul the state’s 
strategic management and performance budgeting system.   Based on the Council’s 
overall objectives and process design, the Governor’s Department of Planning and 
Budgeting worked with the agencies to revise their current program structure.  This 
restructuring involved consolidating some existing programs or resorting them into 
programs and service areas, organizing programs to better align with organizational 
arrangements, and aligning programs and service areas to feed into a strategic 
planning. Each program is linked to a “goal” and each service area is linked to an 
objective that is intended to assist the department in reaching its programmatic goals. 
(Virginia Department of Planning and Budget 2005a) (Janak 2005)  The legislature 
was advised about these changes but was not heavily involved (Hickman 2007).  This 
process was fully implemented in the 2006-2008 biannual budget.  
 
4) What are the restrictions imposed on agencies in terms of moving funds between 
departments/programs and/or line items?   
 
The Virginia legislature allows the Director of the Department of Planning 
and Budget (an executive branch agency) significant authority to oversee and permit 
fund transfers within agencies as long as the transfers support program purposes 
approved by the General Assembly.   
 
“During any fiscal year, the Director, Department of Planning and Budget, 
may transfer appropriation authority within an agency to effect proper 
accounting between fund sources and to effect program purposes approved by 
the General Assembly, unless specifically provided otherwise in this act or as 
specified in the Code of Virginia. However, appropriation authority for local 
aid programs and aid to individuals, with the exception of student financial 
aid, shall not be transferred elsewhere without advance notice to the 
Chairmen of the House Appropriations and Senate Finance Committees. 
Further, any transfers between capital projects shall be made only to realize 
efficiencies or provide for cost overruns unrelated to changes in size or 
scope.”  (Virginia appropriations bill for FY 2007-08: http://leg1.state.va.us/ 
062/bud/chapter3.pdf, p. 544)   
 
However, according to executive staff, the Joint Legislative Audit and 
Review Commission will at times critique DPB for permitting transfers that are too 
large or do not appear to be in keeping with program purposes.   
 
In the appropriations bill, language also specifies the circumstances under 
which DPB can approve transfer of funds across agencies and even between years.  
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The bill may specify that the Director must notify the Appropriations committees of 
these transfers.   
 
Legislative staff report that there are always some tensions in these areas.  
Their general perspective is that there should be significant flexibility to move funds 
from subprogram to subprogram, less to move from program to program and more 
restriction on moving funds between agencies.   
 
Within DPB there is significant oversight of agency transfers and a hierarchy 
of control.  When agencies want to transfer funds between service areas or programs, 
they submit a request to DPB and DPB can stop the request if it is “excessive” or not 
in keeping with legislative intent.  Transfers of over 10 percent of funds between 
programs require approval of the DPB director, whereas smaller transfers can be 
approved by the analyst that oversees the agency (Janak 2007).   
 
5) Are agencies audited at the program level? 
 
The Auditor of Public Accounts reviews levels of spending in the different 
programs or service areas every couple years.  DPB is responsible for adjusting 
program funding levels and service area funding to make sure that expenditure are 
accurately reflect. Legislative staff have enough history with the various levels of 
funding in programs, subprograms, and object classes that they are able to watch for 
consistency from year to year.  
 
6) At what budget level are federal funds appropriated?   
 
Federal funds are reported by program in the appropriations bill under the 
revenue source “federal trust fund.” They are not specifically identified by the name 
of the grant or revenue source. 
 
If federal funds are appropriated by program or line item, what restrictions are 
imposed on their transfer between programs and/or line items?  
 
The restrictions for federal funds are the same as general funds.  Agencies are 
allowed to amend in federal or other special reserve funds; however, the 
appropriations bill specifically instructs the agencies to use these funds prior to using 
general fund dollars.  The Director of the Department of Planning and Budget has 
discretion to move funds to ensure matching dollars are maximized in particular 
circumstances specified in the appropriations bill.  In the past couple of years, the 
legislature has made a significant push to make sure that all federal funds are 
recognized in the appropriate places in the appropriations bill.  Although the 
estimates continue to be conservative, the appropriations bills have gotten much 
closer to the actual amounts (Hickman 2007).   
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7) Does the state allow a “program” designation for “administration” or overhead 
in each agency?   
 
Yes, agencies have administration programs, the purposes of which are 
described in detail in the Governor’s Budget Report.  The overall administration 
program is further broken down into subprograms.  For instance, in the Department 
of Corrections, administration has General Management and Direction, Computer 
Services, Accounting and Budget Services, Architectural and Engineering Services, 
Personnel Services, Planning and Evaluation Services, Procurement and Distribution.  
Also, programs may have an “administration” service area (or subprogram) at times. 
 
8) Can program designations be changed mid-year (outside the regular 
appropriations process)?   
 
No and the legislature rarely adjusts the program structure in the 
appropriations process either.   
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South Carolina 
 
1) Does this state budget at the program level?  At what level do they appropriate 
funds?  
 
Two years ago, Governor Mark Sanford started “activity based budgeting.”  
These activities are akin to “programs” in a program based budgeting system.   The 
state identified over 1500 activities and produced an executive budget that showed 
funding breakdowns by activity.  However, this budget has not crossed over into the 
legislative process.   
 
The legislature does appropriate in part by “programs,” which are different 
from the “activities” in the Governor’s budget.  These “program” definitions are long 
standing and can be traced through many appropriations bills, but staff do not have 
any formal guidelines for these.  Although in some cases these programs do cross 
over organizational lines, these program definitions generally appear to map onto 
functional or organizational divisions. For instance, the Department of Corrections 
budget is broken down by each facility, and has programs for Administration, and 
Employee benefits. The Department of Education has programs such as 
Superintendent of Education, Board of Education, and Division of Curriculum.   
 
Until recently, the State also budgeted by detailed object classes under each 
program.  In the past couple of years, the state consolidated its budget to two object 
classes for each program: personal services and regular operating expenses.   
 
2) How does the state define “what is a program?” 
 
South Carolina defines an “activity” (the equivalent of other state’s 
“programs”) as: “something an organization does to accomplish its goals and 
objectives.  Moreover, an activity is defined as something which consumes resources 
and produces a product, service, or outcome.”(Office of State Budget 2004)  
 
Programs in the appropriations bill are designated as described above.     
 
3) What was the process that the State used to determine program structure?  In 
particular, how did the state coordinate between the agencies, executive budget office 
and legislative budget staff? 
 
“Activities” were defined in conjunction with the establishment of the South 
Carolina Budgeting for Results process.  Key steps in this process included 1) 
establishment of organizational or structural units of “teams,” and 2) development of 
distinct budget processes “steps.”   
 
Teams:  The state established three “teams” to assist with the identification of 
agency activities and the results associated with them.  The Guidance Team 
consisted of the governor’s deputy chief of staff and budget director as well 
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as senior staff of the Office of State Budget.  It was established chiefly to 
plan, support, monitor, and steer the new Budgeting for Results process.  An 
Enterprise-Wide Team was organized to study and analyze best management 
practices, systems, and organizational constructs that were being utilized in 
government, non-profit and/or private sector organizations.  The Enterprise-
Wide Team interacted with the Guidance Team and their results were 
incorporated into the work of the Result Teams (Young et al. 2005).  
 
Eight “Results Teams” composed of private citizens, advocates, legislative 
staff, agency employees, employees from research universities, and others 
worked to develop chief “indicators” of progress and key “strategies” for 
achieving goals.  These indicators and especially the strategies were later 
used as the basis to review, analyze, and ultimately prioritize and rank 
activities for inclusion in the executive budget (South Carolina FY 2005-06 
Executive Budget 2005).   
 
Process: The processes consisted of six steps: 1) setting major goal or result 
areas, 2) developing agency activity (or “program”) inventories, 3) 
developing chief indicators of progress and key strategies for achieving 
results, 4) holding public budget hearings for each result area, 5) sorting and 
prioritizing agency or governmental activities and the identification of 
savings, and 6) distributing resources among goal areas, i.e. the finalization of 
the purchase plan by result areas (Young et al. 2005).  
 
Agencies submitted their activities over the summer to the Budget and 
Control Board’s Office of State Budget (OSB) to be included in a master 
activities database which eventually included more than 1500 separate and 
distinct activities performed by the state. (Young et al. 2005)  OSB budget 
analysts meet with executive branch staff and appropriate budget analysts 
from the House Ways and Means and Senate Finance Committees to evaluate 
the activity descriptions and outcome measures (South Carolina FY 2005-06 
Executive Budget 2005). 
 
Although the information on activities is presented in detail in the Executive 
Budget, a crosswalk between the Executive Budget and the existing appropriations 
bill program structure would be complex – some activities cut across the programs as 
defined in the appropriations bill or there are multiple activities in one program.  
Because the legislature has not accepted the activity designations as a basis for 
appropriations and the crosswalk is so complex, activity designations have not been 
incorporated into the appropriations process.  There appears to be some question as to 
whether the Governor will continue to use the activity classifications in future budget 
years.   
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4) What are the restrictions imposed on agencies in terms of moving funds between 
departments/programs and/or line items?   
 
After notifying the State Budget and Control Board, agencies can transfer up 
to 20 percent of funds across program designations.  They cannot transfer more than 
$100,000 or 2 percent of funds between personal services and the other operating 
accounts.  To transfer funds  above  these  amounts,  the  agency  must  receive  
approval from the State Budget and Control Board.23  South Carolina is different in 
its budget management structure from many other states because the primary 
budgetary staff under the State Budget and Control Board answer both to the 
Governor and to the legislature.24   
 
5) Are agencies audited at the program level? 
 
The Legislative Audit Counsel can conduct performance audits; otherwise 
financial audits are conducted to ensure that the agencies are complying with the law.  
 
6) At what budget level are federal funds appropriated?   
 
Federal funds and other non-general funds are “authorized” by the legislature, 
not actually appropriated.  They are authorized at the program level as well as the 
object class level.  Agencies submit projections of anticipated federal funds when 
they submit their initial budget to the Governor.  The State Comptroller’s office also 
makes projections about some fund sources.  The Office of State Budget (OSB) then 
adds these projections to the appropriations bill and these funds are subject to the 
same budget controls as general funds.  The OSB and agencies may “lowball” their 
estimates of federal funds to make sure that they are conservative in case anticipated 
funds are not received.  The federal and other funds are grouped together in the bill 
and are not specifically identified.   
 
 
                                                          
23  “Agencies and institutions shall be authorized to transfer appropriations within programs and 
within the agency with notification to the Division of Budget and Analyses and Comptroller 
General.  No such transfer may exceed twenty percent of the program budget.  Upon request, 
details of such transfers may be provided to members of the General Assembly on an agency by 
agency basis.  Transfers of appropriations from personal service accounts to other operating 
accounts or from other operating accounts to personal service accounts may be restricted to any 
established standard level set by the Budget and Control Board upon formal approval by a 
majority of the members of the Budget and Control Board.”  From: General Appropriations Bill 
for FY2005-2006 (H. 4810) as ratified by the General Assembly, Part IB, Operation of State 
Government, Section 72.10. (GP: Transfers of Appropriations);South Carolina General Assembly, 
116th Session, 2005-2006. [http://www.scstatehouse.net/sess116_2005-2006/appropriations2006/ 
tap1b.htm#s72].  
24 The South Carolina Budget and Control Board which oversees the operations of the Office of 
State Budget is composed of the Governor, the State Treasurer, the State Comptroller, the 
Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee and the Chairman of the Senate Ways and Means 
Committee.  
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7) Does the state allow a “program” designation for “administration” or overhead 
in each agency?   
 
Some “overhead,” such as the lead administrator’s office in an agency (e.g., 
the Superintendent of Education), are reported in the appropriations bill as its own 
program.  Otherwise, administration is allocated to each program by the agency and 
the OSB trusts the agencies to allocate it appropriately.   
 
8) Can program designations be changed mid-year (outside the regular 
appropriations process)?   
 
No, agencies submit requests to change program designations as part of the 
budget process.  As noted earlier, the activities designations, which would represent a 
significant overhaul of existing budget practices, have not really affected the budget 
process in a serious way. 
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Pennsylvania 
 
1) Does this state budget at the program level?  At what level do they appropriate 
funds?  
 
Pennsylvania began instituting a Planning, Programming and Budgeting 
System in 1968.  The transition was intended to ensure that budgetary decisions were 
made based on program performance in relation to executive policy objectives and 
considered both the results achieved and the costs incurred.  In 1978, a new budget 
law was enacted that required all budgeted programs to have stated objectives and 
quantifiable means to evaluate the results.  The budget process was designed to 
answer the question:  What is the result of a government program in terms of its 
effect on people and the environment? (Pennsylvania Office of the Budget 1999) 
 
The distinguishing features of Pennsylvania’s budget process can be 
summarized as follows: 
 
● The use of programs within agencies to classify and explain activities and 
associated costs. 
 
● The use of clearly stated objectives for each program. 
 
● The use of performance measurements that gauge the progress toward an 
objective and which show the more direct result of the activities conducted. 
 
● The use of total costs, regardless of source, associated with each program. 
 
● The use of an extended time horizon (5 years) over which to project all data. 
 
● The use of Budget Instructions and Program Policy Guidelines documents 
which explicitly guide agencies in the development of their budget requests. 
(Pennsylvania Office of the Budget 1999) 
 
Most agencies in the 2006-07 General Fund Budget are appropriated at the program 
level.   The Department of Community and Economic Development is separated into 
76 different programs, such as: 
 
● PennPORTS for the operating and administrative expenses of the 
Philadelphia Regional Port Authority. 
 
● Increasing international trade. 
 
● Marketing to attract tourists to this Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
An Analysis of the Implementation of  
Program Budgeting in Georgia   
 
 
 64 
The Department of Health has 54 programs including: 
 
● WIC - Administration and Operation. 
 
● State health care centers. 
 
● Breast and cervical cancer screenings. 
 
● Bio-technology research. 
 
● Regional poison control centers. 
 
The Department of Public Welfare has 48 programs including: 
 
● TANFBG – Statewide - Federal appropriation. 
 
● Medical Assistance—Statewide—Federal appropriation. 
 
● Statewide operations related to county administration of the public assistance 
and medical assistance programs. 
 
● Child support enforcement. 
 
However, one agency that is not appropriated at the program level is the 
Department of Corrections.  The Department of Corrections only lists four budget 
categories in the appropriations bill: General Government Operations, Medical Care, 
Inmate Education and Training, and State Correctional Institutions.  Budgets for 
personnel and operations that are general to the Department are combined into the 
General Government Operations category.  Each correctional institution budgets for 
all programs and operating costs at each institution and those facility budgets are 
combined into a single line item in the appropriations. (Pennsylvania General 
Assembly 2005)  
 
2) How does the state define “what is a program?” 
   
Pennsylvania defines a program in a tiered structure, with each tier using the 
term “program.”  At the highest level of aggregation are seven broadly stated goals 
for state government termed “Commonwealth Programs.”  The Commonwealth 
Programs include the areas of: 
 
Direction and Supportive Services; 
Protection of Persons and Property; 
Health and Human Services; 
Education; 
Economic Development; 
Transportation and Communication; 
Recreation and Cultural Enrichment. 
An Analysis of the Implementation of  
Program Budgeting in Georgia   
 
 
 65
The next level below Commonwealth Programs is Program Categories which 
define the goals in more specific terms, such as “clean air environment.”  Program 
Categories are then divided into subcategories, which are considered “programs” in 
the budget documents.  Statements of purpose enumerate the objectives of these 
programs in terms of measurable outcomes.  The focus of the Governor’s Executive 
Budget is on the agency subcategory or program level of the program hierarchy. 
(Pennsylvania Office of the Budget 1999) 
 
Within the context of the appropriations bill, programs are defined to produce 
a consistent relationship to appropriations; a single program is funded by one or more 
funding sources.  This allows the total appropriated amounts to be associated with a 
single program.  Prior to this change, a single appropriation could support several 
programs; however, this made it difficult to determine the total appropriation amount 
requested by reading any given program proposal. (Pennsylvania Office of the 
Budget 1999)   
 
3) What was the process that the State used to determine program structure?  In 
particular, how did the state coordinate between the agencies, executive budget office 
and legislative budget staff? 
 
Although the current budget structure was developed approximately 30 years 
ago, the program structure has been adjusted to harmonize programs in the Executive 
budget with the appropriations bill.  Fundamentally, the program structure is used to 
organize goals and objectives so that activities of different organizational units 
designed to accomplish similar results can be reviewed for decision purposes within 
the appropriate program context.  The programs are also designed so that the 
distribution of funds such as The Preventive Health and Health Services Federal 
Block Grant Funds which are provided to accomplish several different goals can be 
monitored and evaluated.   Program structure provides the means for determining 
what information is required for the management and evaluation of program 
operations. (Pennsylvania Office of the Budget 1999) 
 
4) What are the restrictions imposed on agencies in terms of moving funds between 
departments/programs and/or line items?   
 
Funds are appropriated to either central administration or for program costs.  
The Executive Budget Office monitors and controls how those funds are budgeted 
and spent.  Once the appropriations have been made, proposed program budgets are 
reallocated based on the amounts appropriated and internally allocated to specific 
budget line items.  Budget Office analysts ensure that funds are being allocated 
appropriately.  The Comptrollers’ office verifies that funds are actually spent from 
the correct cost codes and any discrepancies are resolved prior to payment.   
 
Within a program, transfers can be made between the amounts budgeted for 
different operating costs such as utilities and supplies (which may include more than 
one appropriated line item), as well as between major categories such as salaries, 
operating expenses or fixed assets. 
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According to the Budget Office, because of adherence with legislative intent 
there is almost no flexibility for transferring funds between programs.  Under limited 
circumstances, such as an emergency, funds could be transferred from one program to 
another if the purposes of the transfer remain consistent with the original legislative 
intent.  An example given would be transferring funds from one Department of 
Agriculture program to another in the case of Avian Flu.  Although the Department of 
Agriculture recognizes that there will be some years in which outbreaks of Avian Flu 
occur, it does not make sense to maintain an Avian Flu quarantine program at all 
times.  If an outbreak did occur, funds could be transferred from another program for 
poultry safety to act as “seed” money for the Avian Flu quarantine and destruction 
program, but the Department of Agriculture would be required to request approval for 
the transfer, either from the Budget Office or through the legislature as an allocation 
amendment.  Subsequent funding to operate an Avian Flu program would have to be 
requested through the legislature. (Donely & Zweiacher 2006) 
 
5) Are agencies audited at the program level? 
 
The program budgeting system established in 1968 includes provisions for 
the Office of the Budget, “to initiate and conduct evaluations of the effectiveness and 
management efficiency of programs supported by any agency under the Governor’s 
jurisdiction, and to direct, coordinate, assist and/or advise any agency under the 
Governor’s jurisdiction in the conduct of evaluations of its programs or of the 
programs it supports.”  Program evaluations test the relationships between outputs 
and impacts and identity ways to promote efficiency and provide information for 
budget decision making.  The Secretary of the Budget prepares reports detailing the 
results of program evaluations for distribution to the Governor, the General 
Assembly, interested agencies, stakeholders and interest groups, and the public. 
(Pennsylvania Office of the Budget 1999)   
 
In order to ensure that funds or expenses are not being misdirected within a 
program or to other programs, both pre-audits and post-audits are performed.  Pre-
audit activities are performed by the Office of the Budget, Comptroller Operations 
staff on a daily basis as transactions occur to ensure that the transactions are being 
charged to the appropriate cost codes within the appropriate programs. (Donely & 
Zweiacher 2006)  Although financial in nature, pre-audit findings and issues may 
lead to further special audits or evaluations.  Post-audit activities are conducted by 
three audit agencies: 
 
1) Several larger Commonwealth agencies maintain their own audit units. 
 
2) Each of the six Comptrollers Offices in the Office of the Budget has an audit 
staff. 
 
3) The Fiscal Code provides for the Auditor General who conducts a majority of 
the financial audits. (Pennsylvania Office of the Budget 1999) 
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6) At what budget level are federal funds appropriated?   
 
Within each agency’s section of the appropriations bill, federal funds are 
appropriated as line items at the program level.  An example in House Bill 2499, Part 
II, General Fund and Federal Appropriations for 2006-2007, where both Federal and 
State General Fund Appropriations are listed at the program level, would be the 
appropriations within the Department of Education (DOE) for the teacher 
development program (page 68):  
 
       Federal  State 
For teacher professional development. 
   State appropriation…..    23,367,000 
 
The following Federal amounts are appropriated 
for teacher professional development 
 (1) "Teacher Recruitment." 
Federal appropriation......  192,000 
(2) "Teacher Quality Enhancement." 
Federal appropriation......  1,764,000 
   
Appropriated funds cannot be transferred from one program to another, 
except in very limited circumstances, such as an emergency.  Any unused funds are 
required to be returned back to the general fund at the end of the fiscal year.  The 
only exception would be under emergency circumstances in which funds could be 
redirected to a related purpose. (Donely & Zweiacher 2006)    
  
7) Does the state allow a “program” designation for “administration” or overhead 
in each agency?   
 
Each state agency has an appropriated category, “For the general government 
operations of….,” that covers the central administration and overhead for the agency.  
Administration charges that are specific to a particular program are included in the 
appropriation for that program. (Pennsylvania General Assembly 2005) 
 
8) Can program designations be changed mid-year (outside the regular 
appropriations process)?   
 
Program designations are not allowed to be changed outside the regular 
appropriations process.   
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Iowa 
 
1) Does this state budget at the program level?  At what level do they appropriate 
funds?  
 
The 2007 Executive Budget Report uses “functional” categories and a unique 
“purchasing results” format.  The definition of “function” includes both “operating 
units” and “programs.”  For instance, functions in the Department of Corrections 
(DOC) are composed of “operating units” such as each correctional institution or 
community based corrections district as well as “programs” such as corrections 
education.  The funds for these operating units and programs then are further divided 
into object classes in the budget report by agency (Iowa Department of Management 
2006).  For instance, the Ft. Madison Correctional Institution is an operating unit for 
which object classes are reported.  Programs, also reported, may cut across operating 
units.  For example, the corrections education program is embedded in each 
correctional institution but is reported as a separate budget item in the Budget Report.  
Examples of operating units and programs are illustrated below: 
   
Operating Units:   Community Based Corrections Districts (8)  
Correctional Institutions (9)  
 
Programs:  Corrections Education  
Iowa Corrections Offender Network, and  
(Central Office) Administration 
 
 The appropriations bill follows a similar format, appropriating funds either by 
operating unit or by program.  Programs are designed to provide services throughout 
the agency rather than at a particular institution.  The appropriations bill does not 
divide appropriated amounts into object classes, but does identify object classes as 
groups.  So for instance, an appropriation for a correctional institution specifies that 
amounts are budgeted for “salaries, support, maintenance and miscellaneous 
purposes.” In the appropriations bill, there is also language explaining that the 
“department may reallocate the funds appropriated and allocated as necessary to best 
fulfill the needs of the correctional institutions, administration of the department, and 
the judicial district departments of correctional services.” (Iowa General Assembly, 
House Bill 2558 [2006]) 
 
 The special purchasing results format used by the state also resembles a 
programmatic format.  These “purchasing results programs” re-categorize agency 
funding in an attempt to cluster agency activities around major objectives that the 
public can easily understand.  For instance, under the “safe communities” objective, 
the state has “purchasing results programs” such as “Homeland Security and 
Emergency Management” and “Department of Corrections Re-Entry Process.”  The 
purchasing results programs and process is used for formulating the Executive 
Budget Report but has not crossed over into the legislative budget process.  
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2) How does the state define “what is a program”? 
 
The functional programs that are in the appropriations bill are long standing 
budget categories and would only be changed by legislative action. 
 
The Purchasing Results process at the Executive Budget level creates 
programs by bundling related activities into a plan to accomplish certain results for a 
certain cost.  These are called “purchasing results offers.” These “offers” may require 
agencies to cross the traditional lines between programs, departments, or agencies.  
During the FY 06 budget process, six different departments each made proposals for 
early childhood development programs.  The “buying team” in the Governor’s office 
then instructed the six departments to prepare a proposal for one integrated program.  
These programs are established as a part of the Purchasing Results process described 
below.   
 
3) What was the process that the State used to determine program structure?  In 
particular, how did the state coordinate between the agencies, executive budget office 
and legislative budget staff? 
 
Iowa began a new budgeting process termed “Purchasing Results” for FY06.  
The process started when the Governor and Lt. Governor set priorities and result 
criteria for the state.  Given this directive, the state agencies acting as “sellers” 
proposing services/outcomes as “offers” that “buying teams” from the Governor’s, 
Lt. Governor’s and Department of Management’s offices ranked and “purchased.”  
These “purchased results” formed the basis for the Executive Budget.  However, 
there was little legislative buy-in since the process was new and the “buying teams” 
crossed the legislative budget subcommittees’ areas of responsibility.  Based on 
lessons learned in FY06, in FY07 the “buying teams” were aligned by legislative 
subcommittee.  In addition, “offers” were sent to only one buying team instead of 
multiple teams, although they could be transferred to a different buying team if the 
offer was determined to be more applicable to another team. (Chrisinger 2006) 
 
In FY07, there still was very little legislative acceptance of the purchasing 
results format; however, the process within the agencies went much more smoothly.  
The Department of Management (DOM) developed budgeting software that allowed 
the agencies to input the information once and then run reports either in the 
traditional functional format or in the purchasing results format. (Chrisinger 2006)   
 
Governor Vilsack is not running for reelection, and Jim Chrisinger, (Team 
Leader, Strategic Planning and Accountability Team, Iowa Department of 
Management) did not know whether either of the candidates for Governor would 
continue the “Purchasing Results” method of budgeting. (Chrisinger 2006) 
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4) What are the restrictions imposed on agencies in terms of moving funds between 
departments/programs and/or line items?   
 
Agencies may transfer funds within an appropriation without restriction; 
however, if an agency wants to transfer funds between appropriations, the 
Department of Management (DOM) must initiate an appropriation transfer and notify 
the legislature.  Appropriations are made at the functional unit or program level and 
include for example “salaries, support, maintenance, and miscellaneous purposes.”   
As an example the Department of Education (DOE) would be allowed to transfer 
between budget items for supplies and utilities within an appropriation; however, if a 
transfer was necessary between elementary and secondary education or between 
institutions of higher learning, the DOE would request an appropriations transfer 
from the DOM with notification to the legislature. (McMahon 2006) 
 
The Department of Corrections is different.  As a “charter agency,” the 
Department may reallocate appropriated funds as necessary across functional 
categories (which include programs and operating units) to best fulfill the agency’s 
mission.  The DOC is required to notify the Legislative Services Agency and the 
Department of Management prior to the effective date of the reallocation and may not 
reallocate an appropriation that would eliminate a program.  Other than the 
prohibition on eliminating a program, there is no monetary limit to the amount that 
can be reallocated. (Iowa General Assembly, House Bill 2558 [2006])   
 
5) Are agencies audited at the program level? 
 
The State Auditor’s Office is responsible for performing financial audits for 
all agencies annually.  In addition, they audit the CAFR, perform single audits of 
federal grants, and perform departmental audits.  The Legislative Oversight 
Committee can request audits of any agency, department or program, and on rare 
occasions the legislature as a whole requests an audit. 
 
Continuing with the DOC as an example, the State Auditor audits each 
correctional institution yearly.  This audit would review all programs at that particular 
prison.  They would not examine programs on a DOC-wide basis.  For instance, they 
would not audit Corrections Education as a whole, but would audit this program as a 
part of the review of each correctional institution. 
 
Efficiency and effectiveness audits are also performed to determine if the 
departments/ programs are operating in an appropriate manner.  
 
6) At what budget level are federal funds appropriated?   
 
 Some federal funds are appropriated in a separate budget bill and are 
allocated specifically to departments, agencies, or programs. For instance, in FY07, 
$13 million in federal grants for substance abuse were specifically appropriated to the 
Department of Public Health.  Other federal funds are appropriated specifically to 
programs and agencies. In a separate section, departments and agencies are given a 
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blanket authorization to receive and spend other non-specific federal funds “for the 
purposes set forth in the grants, receipts, or conditions accompanying the receipt of 
the funds, unless otherwise provided by law.”  (Iowa General Assembly, House Bill 
2238 [2006]) 
 
7) Does the state allow a “program” designation for “administration” or overhead 
in each agency?   
 
Yes, but different agencies do it differently.  Some agencies allocate overhead 
across the functions (i.e., operating units and programs) and some have a lump sum 
category for administration for the department as a whole.  The Department of 
Management encourages agencies to allocate the overhead to operating units and 
programs because DOM wants the budget offers to reflect the full cost of the program 
and because the legislative budget subcommittees often view “administration” as an 
easy place to make cuts. (Chrisinger 2006) 
 
8) Can program designations be changed mid-year (outside the regular 
appropriations process)?   
 
Purchasing results programs have not yet been incorporated into the 
legislative budget process. Agencies cannot eliminate regular functional program 
categories or add new functional programs without legislative approval.    
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Texas 
 
1) Does this state budget at the program level?  At what level do they appropriate 
funds?  
 
Texas budgets at the “strategy” level, which corresponds to the program level 
in other states.  Strategies are the actions the agency plans to take to achieve its goals.  
There may be multiple strategies under each goal.  Strategy requests are prepared by 
agencies to provide justification for funding, and these requests link the budget to 
statewide goals, benchmarks, and service categories.  An example of the budget from 
the Department of Criminal Justice would be: 
 
Goal A:  Provide Prison Diversions 
A.1.1. Strategy:  Basic Supervision 
A.1.2. Strategy:  Diversion Programs 
A.1.3. Strategy:  Community Corrections 
A.1.4. Strategy:  Treatment Alternatives to Incarceration 
Goal B:  Special Needs Offenders 
Goal C:  Incarcerate Felons 
Goal D:  Facilities Construction 
Goal E:  Operate Parole System 
Goal F:  Indirect Administration 
 
The goal “Incarcerate Felons” includes 16 strategies including correctional 
security, health services, correctional industries and contracts with privately owned 
prisons. (Texas Legislature (79th) 2005) 
 
2) How does the state define “what is a program”? 
 
Strategies (programs) are the actions or group of actions that will be 
implemented to help an agency achieve its goals and objectives.  Strategies are the 
point at which performance expectations are introduced to the appropriations process.  
Strategies include the means of transforming inputs into outputs, and ultimately 
outcomes, with the best use of resources (Legislative Budget Board, and Planning 
and Policy Governor's Office of Budget 2006). Agencies are required to develop five 
year strategic plans, updated every two years, which outline the goals, strategies and 
performance measures the agency plans to accomplish.  The Legislative Budget 
Board (LBB) converts the budget elements laid out in the strategic plan into the 
budget recommendation presented to the legislature for action as the appropriations 
bill.  Funds are appropriated at the Strategy level. (Governor's Office of Budget, 
Planning and Policy 2006) 
 
Agencies are required to provide a narrative description of each strategy, which 
must include each of the following items: 
 
● Specific statutory and/or constitutional provisions authorizing each strategy. 
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● Functional activities associated with the strategy. 
 
● Efforts to respond to court orders and/or federal mandates. 
 
● Relationship with other agency strategies and associated funding 
requirements. 
 
● Other factors justifying implementation of the strategy. 
 
● New initiatives not currently funded or authorized and 
 
● Means by which the strategy contributes to meeting primary agency goals and 
objectives as well as priority goals and benchmarks. (Texas Legislative 
Budget Board 2006) 
 
3) What was the process that the State used to determine program structure?  In 
particular, how did the state coordinate between the agencies, executive budget office 
and legislative budget staff? 
 
“In 1991, Texas revised its budget process. Previously, budgeting had been 
based on zero-based budgeting concepts. The 1991 budget reform required agencies 
to engage in a strategic planning process for a five year time horizon and to identify 
programs and performance measures in conjunction with this process. Programs and 
performance measures then link to budgeting and evaluation. The focus of this reform 
was to better integrate agency planning and decision-making with budget decisions. 
Key elements of the reform include: 
 
● Agency development of six year strategic plans, in which they identify 
programs and program outcome, output, and explanatory measures. 
 
● Integration of agency goals, objectives, and selected outcome, output and 
explanatory measures into the legislative appropriations requests (LARs). 
 
● Reporting agency goals, objectives and selected performance measures in the 
budget documents. 
 
● Program level appropriations. 
 
● Legislative determination of performance targets as part of the budget 
process. 
 
● Legislative Budget Board (LBB) assessments of agency progress towards 
performance targets. 
 
● Department of Audits certification of performance measures.” (Bourdeaux 
2006a) 
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According to John Barton, LLB,the number of strategies an agency can have 
depends on the size and complexity of the agency.  The LBB has imposed a basic 
structure on most licensing agencies, such as the Medical Board, limiting the number 
of strategies allowed; however, agencies with larger budgets may have numerous 
strategies.  Agencies are encouraged by the Governor (Executive Branch) to have 
more rather than fewer strategies because it allows maximum flexibility in 
conjunction with the line-item veto.  The determination of the appropriate number of 
strategies within agencies took three to four years to accomplish by the LBB.  
Because Texas has a weak-governor form of government, the LBB’s 
recommendations to the legislature carry more weight than the executive budget. 
(Barton 2007)   
 
4) What are the restrictions imposed on agencies in terms of moving funds between 
departments/programs and/or line items?   
 
Agencies are allowed to transfer appropriated funds between strategies within 
a goal or up to 20 percent of funds between goals within an agency.25   Any transfers 
that exceed the amount or percentage allowed in the appropriations bill must be 
approved by the Governor and the LBB.  In addition, agencies are allowed to transfer 
limited funds from the second year of the biennium to the first year with the prior 
approval of the Governor and LBB.  Due to the biennial budget, the legislature is 
only in session for five months every other year.   
 
In the legislature’s absence, the LBB and the Governor can use a 
constitutional authority called a “budget execution” to oversee transfer funds between 
agencies or programs within an agency that are outside of the amounts normally 
allowed.  Either the LBB or the governor may initiate a transfer to move money from 
one state agency to another, to spend money within an agency for a purpose different 
than the one for which the money was appropriated, to change the timing of an 
appropriation or to prohibit a state agency from spending money; however, both the 
LBB and the Governor must agree on the proposal for the budget execution to be 
adopted. (Barton 2007)  Public hearings may be held by the party (Governor or LBB) 
who did not initiate the proposed change.  The proposal may then be accepted, 
rejected, or the Governor and LBB may make changes in the proposal (Legislative 
Budget Board).  An example would be the actions taken by the LBB and the 
Governor after Hurricane Rita.  Because the legislature was not in session, the LBB 
and Governor transferred funds between agencies to remediate the effects of the 
disaster. (Barton 2007)   
 
 
                                                          
25 Within an agency, “[f]unds may be transferred between goals (and strategies); provided, that 
before any transfer between goals which will have the cumulative effect of changing the 
expenditures for any goal by more than 20 percent of the amount appropriated for that goal for the 
fiscal year, written notification of intent to transfer be provided the Governor, the Legislative 
Budget Board, the Senate Finance Committee, and the House Appropriations Committee.” (Texas 
Legislature 2005) 
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5) Are agencies audited at the program level? 
 
The Texas State Auditor’s Office performs both strategy (program) and 
financial audits.  Recent examples of each type of audit would be “An Audit Report 
on Performance Measures at Five State Agencies,” Report 07-005 released December 
4, 2006 which is at the strategy level and “An Audit Report on the Financial 
Management Practices at the Texas Medical Board,” Report 07-012 released 
February 8, 2007. 
 
The State Comptroller’s office maintains control over agency spending by 
reviewing all expenditures.  An Appropriations Control Officer is assigned to oversee 
and approve the expenditures of each agency.  Each quarter a reconciliation report is 
issued for each agency that details year-to-date spending at the strategy level. (Barton 
2007) 
 
6) At what budget level are federal funds appropriated?   
 
All funds including federal funds and other non-general funds are bundled 
together with state general funds in the appropriation for each strategy.  However, at 
the beginning of each agency’s section in the appropriations bill, there is a Method of 
Financing (MOF) section that breaks out all the funding sources at the agency level 
including:  General Revenue Fund, General Revenue Fund—Dedicated, Federal 
Funds, and Other Funds.   
 
7) Does the state allow a “program” designation for “administration” or overhead 
in each agency?   
 
Each agency includes “Indirect Administration” as one of the goals in the 
appropriations bill.  The Indirect Administration Goal may be a single line item 
amount or may be subdivided into strategies (programs).  The Indirect Administration 
goal for the Department of Criminal Justice includes the following as strategies: 
 
● Central Administration. 
 
● Correctional Training. 
 
● Inspector General. 
 
● Victim Services. 
 
● Information Resources. 
 
● Other Support Services. 
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8) Can program designations be changed mid-year (outside the regular 
appropriations process)?   
 
Changes to the existing budget structure must be approved by the Governor’s 
Office of Budget, Planning, and Policy (GOBPP) and the LBB and cannot be 
changed outside the regular appropriations process.  Changes are reviewed by both 
budget offices to ensure that the structure will provide an appropriated basis for 
budgetary analysis.  Agencies wishing to make changes in a previously approved 
budget structure must submit a written request to the two budget offices by an April 
deadline. (Texas Legislative Budget Board 2006) 
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New Mexico 
 
1) Does this state budget at the program level?  At what level do they appropriate 
funds?  
 
The state appropriates at the program level.  For instance, the Department of 
Corrections has six programs including: Inmate Management and Control, Inmate 
Programming, Corrections Industries, Community Offender Management, 
Community Corrections – vendor run, and Program Support.  It also appropriates at 
several object class levels under each program.  These are: Personal Services and 
Employee Benefits, Contractual Services, Other, and Other Financing Uses (which 
captures transfers of funds between agencies).   
 
Both the Governor’s Budget Report and other Legislative Finance Office 
recommendations on the budget follow the same format as the appropriations bill.   
One interesting variation on program allocations is that full time equivalents (FTEs) 
are authorized by the legislature by program.  The Governor regularly line item 
vetoes the provisions in the appropriations bill that would provide legal enforcement 
for this authorization; the legislature, however, continues to hold the agencies to this 
requirement.   
 
2) How does the state define “what is a program?” 
 
Program means a “set of activities undertaken in accordance with a plan of 
action organized to realize identifiable goals and objectives based on 
legislative authorization.” 
 
Program Structure is an “orderly, logical array of programs at the agency 
level. Program structure will not necessarily correspond to functional, 
organizational or geographical divisions since different functional, 
organizational, or geographic divisions may serve the same basic purpose or 
end.” 
 
Program Budgeting is a “budget system that focuses on program objectives, 
program achievements and program cost effectiveness, basing decision 
making on outcomes rather than inputs. A program budget organizes the 
expenditure budget in terms of total cost of programs to be implemented.” 
(New Mexico Legislative Finance Committee 2006b) 
 
Although these are the technical definitions of programs, programs are based 
on agreements with the agencies that were worked out over the course of several 
years.  According to the “Accountability in Government Act,” the executive approves 
or disproves the program structure in consultation with the legislature.  Most of the 
programs took previous “activities” and rolled them up into larger program structures. 
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The agency also budgets across four “fund” types: general fund, other state 
funds, internal service funds/interagency transfers and federal funds. 
 
3) What was the process that the State used to determine program structure?  In 
particular, how did the state coordinate between the agencies, executive budget office 
and legislative budget staff? 
 
This process began in the early 1990s, so it has been underway for some time.  
Initially the state started with pilot agencies that were willing to do it.  These agencies 
were mostly “regulatory agencies” that volunteered – such as the Commission on 
Higher Education and the Division of Vocational Rehabilitation.  Also these agencies 
tended to have significant federal funds so they were already required by the federal 
government to produce performance measures.   
 
Although there was substantial disagreement over the program initially, now 
they tend to agree on the programs and know it is better to have common ground.  
The initial process required the agencies to start out with a strategic plan, to do an 
internal/external assessment and develop a mission statement, vision and goals.  Once 
these had been developed then the agencies identified programs.  In this process the 
state used documents from the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) and 
looked at other states – particularly Texas, Louisiana, and North Carolina.  They also 
used the American Society for Public Administration guide: Performance 
Measurement Concepts and Techniques.   
 
The legislature bought off on having larger programs because the entire 
reform was sold to the agencies as giving them increased flexibility in return for 
producing results.  Most agencies caught on quickly that they would be better off 
with large programs.  A few had to do major restructurings – the Department of 
Health for instance said that its programs were not organized correctly and so did a 
big restructure. 
 
The agencies do have a set of “activities” and additional subclasses that they 
track below the program level, but these are not tracked by the executive state budget 
division (SBD) in the Department of Finance and Administration (DFA) or the 
Legislative Finance Committee (LFC).  Both of these entities may request 
information at a lower level of aggregation but they don’t actually see it on a regular 
basis (Fernandes 2006). 
 
4) What are the restrictions imposed on agencies in terms of moving funds between 
departments/programs and/or line items?   
 
In the appropriations bill, there are often detailed provisions that are agency 
specific about how funds can be transferred or “amended in.”  In general, agencies 
can move money between object classes by making a Budget Adjustment Request 
(BAR) but cannot move money between programs unless given specific permission 
in the appropriations bill.  To make a BAR, the agency submits the request to the 
executive SBD who approves or disproves the request.  If the SBD approves the 
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request then it goes to the LFC and the LFC has 10 days to approve or object (if there 
is no response from the LFC, the request is considered to be approved).  If the LFC 
objects, this stops the transfer until a hearing is held by the legislature, which must 
occur within 35 days, starting with the receipt of the request.  The legislature can 
delay but cannot legally stop the transfer; however, in so far as an agency does not 
want to alienate the legislature, then the agency is likely to respond to the objection.   
 
In some years, the legislature has taken away the flexibility to move funds 
between personal services and contractual services because of a concern that too 
many state activities were being contracted out.   
 
Agencies can also “amend in” federal funds, other state funds or internal 
service funds/agency transfers throughout the year using the BAR process.  However, 
in the appropriations bill they are typically restricted so that they cannot amend in 
more than 5 percent of the budgeted amount for internal service funds/interagency 
transfer or other state funds at the program level.  They can amend in as much as they 
want in federal funds; however, the legislative staff will do projections prior to the 
appropriations process to try to make sure that the projections for federal funds are 
reflected as accurately as possible in the appropriations bill.    
 
Agencies cannot move money between programs except under circumstances 
specifically described in the appropriations bill.  For instance, the Department of 
Corrections is allowed up to a 5 percent transfer because of problems of cost overruns 
at private facilities (Fernandes 2006; New Mexico Legislative Finance Committee 
2005a).   
 
5) Are agencies audited at the program level? 
 
No, only by object class.  Compliance with the appropriations bills are treated 
as compliance with the law but are not part of the financial audits.  The state is 
relying to some degree on performance audits to assess agency accuracy in 
classifying funds by program.  However, this system is in its beginning stages 
(Fernandes 2006; Williams 2006).   
 
If so, is there some document or guide that explains which expenses should be 
allocated to each program?  
 
The appropriations bill gives a detailed description of the purposes of each 
program; however, the auditor only tracks expenditures by object code.  Agencies 
track and account for fund uses and the appropriate classification of expenditures by 
program.  If the state did audit to programs, it may not be a significant problem 
because programs are designated at a high level of aggregation and the programs are 
clusters of previously defined activities so there is a history of expenditures within 
each program.  
 
 
 
An Analysis of the Implementation of  
Program Budgeting in Georgia   
 
 
 80 
6) At what budget level are federal funds appropriated?   
 
Federal funds are appropriated by program, but are not specifically identified.  
New Mexico has three categories for non-general funds: other state funds, internal 
service funds/internal agency transfers, and federal funds.  The Governor’s Budget 
Report breaks down the fund sources in slightly more detail.  The federal and other 
fund sources are allocated within each program under each of the three object classes. 
 
If federal funds are appropriated by program or line item, what restrictions are 
imposed on their transfer between programs and/or line items?  
 
The transfer of federal funds has been interpreted liberally by the executive 
branch.  Also, federal funds are not restricted by the 5 percent rule described earlier. 
The legislative staff responsible for overseeing budget requests report few shifts in 
federal funds across programs, although there are often significant amendments to 
federal funds within a program category (Fernandes 2006).  It is likely that there are 
few shifts in part because of the ability of the agency to “amend in” funds wherever 
needed and in part because the program categories are broad and inclusive.   
 
How does the state handle the problem of agencies not knowing how much they will 
receive in federal funds during the year and therefore not having an accurate 
accounting of funds prior to appropriations? 
 
Agencies “low ball” their federal fund estimates and then amend in funds 
during the year.  However, the LFC also makes projections based on previous years’ 
funds and based on the Federal Funds Information Service (FFIS) about how much in 
federal funds an agency can expect and may adjust these estimates.  The LFC 
estimates serve as a guide for general fund allocations as well (Fernandes 2006).  
 
7) Does the state allow a “program” designation for “administration” or overhead 
in each agency?   
 
The Department of Corrections has a program for “Program Support.”  The 
appropriations bill specifies that expenses relate to “a clean audit, effective budget, 
personnel management, and cost-effective information system services.”  (New 
Mexico Legislative Finance Committee 2005a) 
 
The Department of Public Education does not have a program for 
administration, but other agencies do have “program support” like the Dept. of 
Corrections.   
 
There does not appear to be any written guidance on how to define 
administration, but there may have been in the early days of the reform.  According to 
the staff, the state has tried to be consistent across agencies about what the 
administration program includes and to limit it to central office functions.  Also, there 
was initially substantial movement to adjust this category. 
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8) Can program designations be changed mid-year (outside the regular 
appropriations process)?   
 
Yes.  The state has a formal process for shifting program designations or 
performance measures.  The agency must submit their request by July 15th and the 
program change is reviewed by the legislature and executive prior to budget 
consideration.  The executive approves program changes in consultation with the 
legislature.  However, it is ultimately an executive responsibility.  
 
9) How does the state handle cost-allocation problems between programs?  Do they 
have any guidance for agencies on this? 
 
Not really since programs are broad and they used previous activity 
categories as a foundation for the development of programs.   
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Oregon 
 
1) Does this state budget at the program level?  At what level do they appropriate 
funds?  
 
Agency budgets are organized into “program units” some of which are 
policy-related and some of which are functional.  For instance, the Department of 
Corrections (DOC) budget is broken out into broad functional areas such as 
“Administration, General Services, and Human Resources,” “Debt Service” and 
“Capital Improvements.”  The Department also has more policy oriented programs 
such as the “Transitional Services” program as well as an “Operations” program 
(related to running correctional institutions). (Oregon Legislative Assembly 2005b)   
 
Similarly, the Department of Human Services’ (DHS) appropriated budget 
has a mix of program units, including “Department-Wide Support Services,” “Capital 
Improvement,” and “Debt Service,” as well as “Children, Adults, and Families,” 
“Health Services,” and “Seniors and People with Disabilities.” (Oregon Legislative 
Assembly 2005a) 
 
In neither example is the budget appropriated at a more detailed level than the 
“program unit.” 
 
2) How does the state define “what is a program?” 
 
A “program unit” is the term used in the Oregon “Budget and Legislative 
Concepts” instructions to describe the budget structure for an agency.  Program units 
are large in scope and the number of program units within an agency varies with the 
size of the agency.  Some small agencies may have only one program unit; however, 
most will have several which include programs related to a particular agency services 
and overhead programs that apply to the agency as a whole such as Administration, 
Capital Improvement, Capital Construction and Debt Service. (Byerly 2006)  
 
3) What was the process that the State used to determine program structure?  In 
particular, how did the state coordinate between the agencies, executive budget office 
and legislative budget staff? 
 
Governor Ted Kulongoski took office in January 2003, a time when the 
Oregon state budget deficit was $3 billion.  Governor Kulongoski’s first executive 
budget was for the 2005-2007 biennium.  In this budget, Gov. Kulongoski introduced 
a “new” way of budgeting based on six core “Oregon Principles.”  Those principles 
were: 
 
● Education and Workforce Development. 
 
● Health and Basic Needs. 
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● Economic Development. 
 
● Livability and the Environment. 
 
● Public Safety. 
 
● Government Efficiency & Accountability. 
 
Each state agency was instructed by the governor to identify all programs 
within their purview and to indicate: 
 
● Whether the program was mandatory and outside of the Executive or the 
Legislature’s control through the regular budgetary process. 
 
● The number of Oregonians served by the program. 
 
● What the program would accomplish for Oregon citizens, and 
 
● How the program would measure progress towards its objectives. 
 
In the past, each agency submitted budget requests organized by agency to the 
Governor’s office reflecting incremental increases.  For the 2005-2007 budget, 
agencies were required to categorize each program unit according to the Oregon 
Principle that it supported.  Agencies also had to provide details of the outcomes each 
was expected to produce.  Although the “Oregon Principles” is the current executive 
budget outline instituted for the 2005-07 biennium, more than 90 percent of the 
budget is driven by the state constitution, statute, judicial decisions, and federal 
mandates according to Doug Wilson, Principal Legislative Analyst in the Legislative 
Fiscal Office (LFO).    
 
In 2003, the Ways and Means Committee directed agencies to align the 
accounting and budgetary structures no later than the 2005-07 biennium budget by 
converting to the newly implemented Oregon Budget Information Tracking System 
(ORBITS) that had been in development for more than a decade as a replacement for 
an older system.  The Budget and Management Division (BAM) of the 
Administrative Services Department works with the Legislative Fiscal Office (LFO) 
and agencies to “ensure that program units adequately present the major policy issues 
and budget data” in the budget process.  The Oregon Budget Information Tracking 
System (ORBITS) used by BAM and the R*Stars accounting program used by the 
agencies are now aligned to allow a direct link between the two systems. (Oregon 
Budget and Management Office and Legislative Fiscal Office 2003) 
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4) What are the restrictions imposed on agencies in terms of moving funds between 
departments/programs and/or line items?   
 
The biennial appropriations bills provide funding at the section or subsection 
level.  An example of funding at the subsection level from the DOC appropriations 
bill would be: 
   
Section 1.  There are appropriated to the Department of Corrections, for the 
biennium beginning July 1, 2005, out of the General Fund, the following 
amounts for the following purposes:  
 
(1) Operations $623,620,310 
 
(2) Administration, general services and human resources $85,071,880 
 
(3) Transitional services $224,696,574 
 
(4) Debt service $101,640,940 
 
(5) Capital improvements $1,078,999. 
 
Transfers may be made between program units funded by the same subsection 
of the appropriations bill.  Using the DOC example, if it were necessary to move 
funds within the program unit of “Administration, General Services, and Human 
Resources,” the transfers could be done internally because they were all funded by 
the same subsection of the appropriations bill.  However, transfers of any amount, 
between the Operations program unit and any other program unit would require prior 
approval from the Oregon Emergency Board because the transfer would be across 
subsections.   
 
The Emergency Board meets approximately every other month during the 
biennium to facilitate the transfer of funds appropriated to the Emergency Board to 
agencies that require additional funds, to approve grant applications, and to approve 
transfers between program units within agencies.  These rules also apply to federal, 
lottery, and other funds. 
 
Also, positions are tied to each appropriation through a database with specific 
codes for each position classification.  The Department of Administrative Services 
(DAS) maintains the database and agencies do not have “live” access to the database.  
In order to transfer a position from one program unit to another, the agency must seek 
formal written approval from the DAS, which requires appropriate justification.  
 
According to Martha McDaniel, Budget Manager, DOC Budget Office, 
requests to the Emergency Board to transfer funds between different sections or 
subsections of the appropriations bill are infrequent.  A review of the minutes of 
several Emergency Board meetings did not reveal any requests for transfers between 
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program units; however, agencies did request additional funding from the Emergency 
Board. 
 
5) Are agencies audited at the program level? 
 
Financial-related examinations are conducted to determine whether state 
agencies comply with finance-related legal requirements and special studies and 
investigations are conducted in response to allegations of misuse of state resources or 
inefficient management practices.   
 
Performance audits are conducted at the program unit or subunit level.  An 
example would be the recent audit of payments made to in-home care providers 
which is a program within the larger Medicaid program, which is itself one of many 
program units within the Department of Human Services.  Other examples of 
performance audits include the Review of the Small Scale Energy Loan Program in 
the Department of Energy and the Review of Statewide Facilities Maintenance 
Processes within the Department of Administrative Services.  (Oregon Secretary of 
State Audits Division 2006) 
 
Factors that are considered in determining what agencies or what programs to 
audit include:  how much money is involved; whether there is legislative or public 
interest in the audit; and is there a “clean-cut” methodology that will allow an audit to 
be done successfully.  Once or twice a year a list of possible audits is compiled and 
then ranked to determine which audits will be performed.  The state does not audit 
federal programs outside of the federally mandated audit requirements: however, it 
does audit programs such as Medicaid that are implemented by the state, but partially 
funded by federal funds. (Garber 2006) 
 
6) At what budget level are federal funds appropriated?   
 
Within each agency’s appropriations bill, federal funds and other non-general 
funds may be appropriated in different ways.  For instance, in the DOC 
appropriations bill, the first section appropriates general funds to each program unit; 
the second section appropriates “fees, moneys or other revenues, including 
Miscellaneous Receipts” to each program unit, and the third section appropriates 
federal funds to the entire agency by setting a cap on the amount of federal funds that 
can be used to cover agency expenses.  In the DHS appropriations bill, the first 
sections allocates general fund monies by program unit; the second section allocates 
“fees, moneys or other revenues, including Miscellaneous Receipts and including 
federal funds for indirect cost recovery” for a variety of specific federal programs 
such as WIC food rebates, the Coordinated School Health Program, homeland 
security, and emergency preparedness and response services. The third section 
allocates lottery funds for specific purposes, and the fourth section allocates all 
federal funds not otherwise specified in the second section to the agency as a whole 
(again, setting a cap on federal funds).  
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7) Does the state allow a program designation for “administration” or overhead in 
each agency?   
 
Administration or “Department-wide support services” are separate line items 
in many agencies’ appropriations.  However, there is no formal definition of 
“administration” for budget purposes.  According to Laurie Byerly, Manager of the 
State Audit and Budget Reporting Section, most agencies capture the administrative 
costs associated with department-wide management, but other costs included in the 
program unit may vary by agency.  Agency appropriations are at varying levels of 
specificity too, so one agency might have a General Fund appropriation specifically 
for administration, while another agency could have a General Fund appropriation for 
the entire agency.  Examples of agencies who receive “lump sum” appropriations 
would be the Department of Revenue, Department of Justice, Department of 
Veterans’ Affairs, and the Licensing Office.  All of these agencies received an 
amount “for payment of expenses” as a lump sum without delineation as to what 
expenses were covered.   
 
8) Can program designations be changed mid-year (outside the regular 
appropriations process)?   
 
No, program designations cannot be changed or eliminated outside of the 
regular legislative appropriations process.  Because Oregon is on a biennial budget, 
an interim legislative budget committee, the Emergency Board, made up of key 
legislators meets bimonthly to approve limited additional funding to agencies from 
the state Emergency Fund appropriation.  If additional monies become available 
during the biennium through outside sources, such as federal grants, the Emergency 
Board can either approve an increase to the appropriated funds in an existing program 
unit or establish limitations for a new program unit.  
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